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INTRODUCTION
omity has long been recognized as a fundamental principle
in private international law. It is widely assumed that the
advent of globalization, which has resulted in the expanded
movement of persons, goods, services, and capital, has increased
the need for international comity in general and respect for de-
cisions of foreign courts in particular.1 However, this Article
challenges this assumption and urges caution when using com-
ity as a tool to inform interpretation and application of interna-
tional instruments. In order to test the proper scope of comity in
the global era, this Article develops a theoretical framework for
analysis, which is rooted in the original basis of that doctrine
and which distinguishes between two types of sovereign inter-
ests of states: comity interests and substantive interests. Mak-
ing use of governmental interest analysis techniques, this
framework facilitates evaluation of whether deferring to a for-
eign state in any given situation actually promotes the relevant
sovereign interests of the two states involved.
The scope of international comity has been described as “elu-
sive”2 and as “one of the most important, and yet least under-
stood, international law canons.”3 A common justification for
1 Elizabeth Buckel, Curbing Comity: The Increasingly Expansive Public Policy
Exception of Chapter 15, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1281 (2013).
2Donald .E. Childress III,Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity
as Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11, 79 (2010).
3 Id. at 13.
C
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comity is that it recognizes the interdependence of legal sys-
tems,4 creates intra-system harmony,5 and promotes interna-
tional or, perhaps more accurately, supra-national interests.
However, the true and original basis of the doctrine is advance-
ment of the interests of individual sovereign states6 via the ben-
efits which comity ought to bring, in particular the maintenance
of amicable working relationships between nations7 and the fa-
cilitation of international commerce and mobility.8 In this sense,
the increasing dependence of national economies on trade with
other states in the global era appears to make the need for com-
ity greater.9
Thus, it is hardly surprising that, although U.S. courts con-
tinue to insist that “the principle of comity has never meant cat-
egorical deference to foreign proceedings” and that “it is implicit
in the concept that deference should be withheld where appro-
priate to avoid the violation of the laws, public policies, or rights
of the citizens of the United States,”10 there is evidence of in-
creased use of the doctrine by U.S. courts in recent years.11 In-
deed, it has been claimed that, in the “tension between respect-
ing fair foreign proceedings and shielding U.S. citizens from for-
eign laws,” the pendulum has swung toward recognition of for-
eign decisions. 12 For example, Folkman shows that U.S. courts
give greater deference to the decisions of foreign courts than they
4 Peter Hay, On Comity, Reciprocity, and Public Policy in U.S. and German
Judgments Recognition Practice, in PRIVATELAW IN THE INTERNATIONALARENA:
FROM NATIONAL CONFLICT RULES TOWARD HARMONIZATION AND UNIFICATION
237 (Jurgen Basedow et al. eds., 2000).
5 Id. at 249.
6 Childress, supra note 2, at 20 (explaining Huber) and 25–28 (explaining
Story); E. Lorenzen, Story’s Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws – One Hun-
dred Years After, 48 HARV. L. REV. 15, 35 (1934) (describing Story’s comity doc-
trine as based on “self-interest”); K.W.PATCHETT, RECOGNITIONOFCOMMERCIAL
JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS IN THE COMMONWEALTH 47‒48 (1984) (arguing that
comity is a rule of domestic law and not of international law).
7 Childress, supra note 2, at 14.
8 Lorenzen, supra note 6. For a reference to “today’s highly interdependent
commercial world,” see F. Hoffman Law-Roche Ltd v. Empagran SA, 542 U.S.
155, 164–65 (2000).
9 Joel Paul, Transformation of International Comity, 71 LAW&CONTEMP. PROB.
19 (2008) (referring to the modern phenomenon of “deference to the market.”).
10 In re Treco, 240 F.3d 148, 157 (2d Cir. 2001).
11 Childress, supra note 2, at 63.
12 Buckel, supra note 1, at 1286–87.
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would give to those of sister states under the doctrine of full faith
and credit.13
Certain scholars, however, have been critical of the almost
“blind” reliance of some judges on the doctrine of comity and
claim that they do not take into account sovereign interests. In
particular, Childress argues that the promotion of sovereign in-
terests—the original rationale for the doctrine—has disap-
peared in U.S. jurisprudence. Rather, in the United States, com-
ity is treated as requiring the application of foreign law without
consideration of sovereign interests.14
As the number of bilateral and multilateral treaties, along
with other international instruments governing the recognition
of foreign judgments, arbitral awards, and applicable law, in-
creases, it might be expected that there will be less need for ju-
dicial reliance on the doctrine of comity because the treaties
themselves set the boundaries for giving effect to foreign law or
judgments and reflect the legislature’s view as to the optimal
balance between comity and other competing domestic interests.
In practice, however, the doctrine of comity is still relevant in
the interpretation of these instruments15 and in exercising any
discretion which they confer.16 Thus, questions still arise as to
the appropriate scope of the doctrine and, in particular, as to the
extent to which the judicial use of the doctrine accurately reflects
sovereign interests in the global era.
This Article will focus on the judicial use of comity in the in-
terpretation and application of the Hague Convention on Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction of 1980 (“the Abduc-
tion Convention”).17 Additionally, in order to provide a broader
perspective, this Article will briefly consider the use of comity by
13 T. Folkman, Two Modes of Comity, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 823 (2013).
14 Childress, supra note 2, at 60–61.
15 It should be noted that comity has also been used in interpreting domestic
statutes, such as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Childress, supra note
2, at 50.
16 Discretion may be conferred under these treaties in a variety of ways. Most
commonly, treaties may give courts discretion to deviate from particular rules
where one of a number of exceptions is established. See discussion infra Parts
II.B and IV.B.
17 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,
Oct. 25, 1980, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter Abduction Convention], available
at http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt28en.pdf. Enacted in the United
States in International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1160 (1988).
Enacted in the United Kingdom as the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985.
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U.S. courts in applying the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency of 1997 (“The Model Law”).18 While interna-
tional child abduction and cross-border insolvency may seem un-
likely bed-fellows, examination of these two regimes reveals re-
markable similarities and comparison between them provides
insight as to the way that the doctrine of comity is—and ought
to be—used by judges in the modern age. In particular, the back-
drop to both the Abduction Convention and the Model Law is
expanding globalization, which, together with other sociological
and economic factors,19 has brought in its wake a significant in-
crease in the phenomena both of international child abduction
and of multinational insolvencies, specifically creditors based in
different jurisdictions pursuing assets situated in more than one
country.20
This Article assesses the extent to which the judicial use of
comity in Abduction Convention cases reflects the real interests
of the states involved by making use of governmental interest
analysis methodology.21 Part I provides the theoretical basis for
this Article, briefly examining the origins and rationales for the
doctrine of comity, the justification for using interest analysis
methodology, and an explanation of how that methodology will
be used in this Article. Part II sets out the mechanisms and ob-
jectives of the Abduction Convention and then explains the ways
in which the doctrine of comity has been used by the judiciary in
the United States, and other common law systems, in interpret-
ing and applying the Convention. Part III applies interest anal-
ysis methodology to the use of comity in abduction cases. Part IV
provides a brief discussion of the use of comity in U.S. Model
Law cases and draws comparisons between the approach in
these cases with the approach in the Abduction Convention
18 Enacted in the United States as Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11
U.S.C. (by title VIII of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Pro-
tection Act of 2005). Enacted in the United Kingdom as the Cross-Border In-
solvency Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1030.
19 Factors such as increase in rates of marriage breakdown and widespread
economic recession.
20 See data in relation to multi-national companies inDevelopments in the Law:
Vii. Chapter 15 and Cross-Border Bankruptcy, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1292, 1292
(2011).
21 As suggested by Childress, supra note 2, at 78–79 (arguing that reliance on
the doctrine of comity should be predicated on the use of governmental interest
analysis to expose and articulate the sovereign interests at stake).
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cases discussed in Part III. Finally, Part V synthesizes these
analyses and proposes a conclusion.
I. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
After a discussion of the development of the doctrine of comity,
this part will briefly explain interest analysis methodology and
set out the rationale for employing this methodology in analyz-
ing the use of comity in the interpretation of international in-
struments.
A. The Doctrine of Comity
The idea that private international law is based on comity
dates back to Huber22 and was adopted by Story.23 The latter
wrote on private international law as follows:
The true foundation on which the subject rests is that rules
which are to govern are those which arise frommutual interest
and utility; from the sense of the inconveniences which would
arise from a contrary doctrine; and from a sort of moral neces-
sity to do justice in order that justice may be done to us in re-
turn.24
Story’s concept of comity clearly includes a number of different
elements and it is therefore unsurprising that the notion of com-
ity has been understood differently by various scholars and
judges. It is also unsurprising that the exact status of the doc-
trine of comity is still unclear.25 The substantive lack of clarity
surrounding the doctrine is exacerbated by terminological con-
fusion, at least in the United States, where the phrase “to extend
comity” has been used generally to refer to the recognition of a
foreign judgment.26
22 Ulrich Huber (1635–94) was a Frisian jurist, whose writings about the con-
flict of laws were extensively cited in Anglo-American cases. ALAN WATSON,
JOSEPHSTORYAND THECOMITY OFERRORS 2 (University of Georgia Press, 1992).
23 Joseph Story, a Professor of Law at Harvard and a judge, is regarded as the
“prime architect of nineteenth-century American conflicts law.” Id. at 2. For a
persuasive analysis of how Story misunderstood Huber, see Watson, id.
24 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 35 (1834).
25 Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L. J. 1, 44 (1991).
For changes in the meaning of comity over the years, see Paul, supra note 9.
26 See, e.g., Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997); Diorinou v.
Mezitis, 237 F.3d 133, 145 (2001); Asvesta v. Petrousas, 580 F.3d 1000 (9th
Cir. 2009).
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One sense in which comity has been understood is that of rec-
iprocity.27 According to this theory, one state (the “forum state”)
applies laws and recognizes judgments of another state (“the for-
eign state”), so that other states will, in turn, apply the forum
state’s law and recognize the forum state’s judgments.28 Thus,
some legal systems refuse to recognize the judgments of those
states that do not reciprocate.29 Moreover, many modern bilat-
eral and multilateral treaties are premised on the reciprocal un-
dertakings of the Contracting States to apply the law of the other
signatory states, or recognize their judgments in accordance
with the rules in the Convention.30 Indeed, it has been said that
comity, in this sense of reciprocity, is “at the heart” of the Ab-
duction Convention31 because Contracting States are only re-
quired to return children who were habitually resident in an-
other Contracting State at the date of the wrongful removal or
retention.32
It seems, however, that the primary use of comity is in the
sense of judicial courtesy.33 That is, foreign laws are applied in
27 Paul, supra note 9, at 20 (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64
(1895)); Hans Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel, 9
UCLAL. REV. 44, 53 (1962). Cf.Hay, supra note 4, at 237 (contrasting reciproc-
ity and comity as two separate concepts, and explaining that reciprocity em-
phasizes local concerns that may disfavor recognition of foreign judgments).
28 Patchett, supra note 6, at 50.
29 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. at 126–131. For the rather patchy history of the
requirement of reciprocity in the United States, see V. Singal, Preserving
Power Without Justice: Creating an Effective Reciprocity Regime for the Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 59 HASTINGS L. J. 943, 947–958
(2008). In Israel, section four of the Foreign Judgments Enforcement Law pred-
icates enforcement of foreign judgments on reciprocal enforcement of Israeli
judgments by the judgment rendering state. Foreign Judgments Enforcement
Law, 5718–1958, 12 L.S.I. 82 § 4 (1958) (Isr.).
30 E.g., Council Regulation No. 44/2001 of 22 December on jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters
(Brussels I) (EC).
31 Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 248 (2d Cir. 1999).
32 See ELISA PEREZ-VERA, EXPLANATORY REPORT ON THE 1980 HAGUE CHILD
ABDUCTION CONVENTION 426, ¶ 37 )1982( [hereinafter PEREZ-VERA REPORT],
available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl28.pdf (explaining that the rights
and duties under the Convention do not apply to non-member states because
mechanisms under the Convention are largely dependent on cooperation be-
tween Central Authorities).
33 See, for example, Hughes v. Cornelius (1680) 2 Show 232 (US), DICEY’S
CONFLICT OF LAWS 7 (London, Stevens, Sweet and Maxwell eds., 9th ed, 1973)
and generally Paul, supra note 9, at 21–27. Cf. J. FAWCETT, J.M. CARRUTHERS,
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preference to forum law, and foreign judgments are recognized,
without review of the merits,34 in order to show deference to
other sovereign states.35 Yet, even if this use of comity is ac-
cepted as the standard, there is still doubt as to the exact nature
and scope of the doctrine. Story, in contrast to Huber,36 clearly
stated that comity did not impose an absolute obligation, but ra-
ther left each state with discretion to determine the extent to
which it would respect foreign law and judgments.37 Moreover,
many doubt whether comity can provide an adequate basis for
actually constructing choice of law rules38—or even recognition
rules.39 Thus, the doctrine may be understood as a theory which
provides general justification for the need to apply foreign laws
and recognize foreign judgments in certain circumstances,40 in
accordance with whatever choice and recognition rules have
been chosen.
Nonetheless, it has been argued that in U.S. case law, comity
has become a rule of law that obligates courts41 to apply foreign
law in some circumstances and to recognize foreign judgments,42
&P.NORTH, CHESHIRE, NORTH ANDFAWCETT, PRIVATE INTERNATIONALLAW (Ox-
ford University Press, 14th ed., 2008) (claiming that courtesy is a matter for
sovereigns and not judges).
34 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. at 202–03.
35 Paul, supra note 9, at 20.
36 Watson, supra note 22, at 19–22.
37 “[E]very nation must be the final judge for itself, not only of the nature and
extent of the duty, but of the occasions on which its exercise may be justly
demanded.” Id. at 20.
38 Inter alia, because it cannot determine which of a number of connected laws
should apply, J.H.C. MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 506 (Stevens ed., 3d ed.
1984) and because of the vagueness of the doctrine. FRIDERICHC. VONSAIVGNY,
A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 76 (1869).
39 The main reason for this doubt is that, on the assumption that comity does
not impose an absolution obligation, recognition would then be based on judi-
cial discretion as opposed to the rights of the parties. MORRIS, supra note 38,
at 506. Similarly, Slade LJ in Adam v. Capes Industries, [1991] 1 All E.R. 929
at 1037, commented that the society of nations will work better if some foreign
judgments are enforceable, but that this truth does not identify which foreign
judgments should be recognized.
40 Childress, supra note 2, at 13.
41 Paul, supra note 9.
42 See also Hay, supra note 4, at 239 (explaining that, in those states where
there is no statutory framework, the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments is based on comity). In relation to recognition of foreign custody or-
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subject to certain limitations,43 and thus functions not only as a
justification for deferring to foreign law, but also as a conflicts
rule.44 Even so, it is clear that the doctrine of comity is charac-
terized by ambiguity, particularly regarding the extent to which
it is binding.45 For example, courts still quote the famous dictum
from the leading nineteenth century case of Hilton v. Guyot46
that extension of comity to a foreign judgment is “neither a mat-
ter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy
and good will, upon the other.”47
For the purpose of this Article, it is almost48 unnecessary to
decide which of the latter two approaches is correct because the
instruments in question provide rules as to the circumstances
under which foreign judgments or lawmust be respected, subject
to stated exceptions and to those circumstances where there is
discretion.49 Thus, when courts in Abduction Convention and
Model Law cases refer to comity, the courts are interpreting and
applying the rules and exceptions in these international instru-
ments in a way that is consistent with the theoretical justifica-
tion for applying foreign law and recognizing foreign judgments.
Accordingly, in the context of these instruments, comity cannot
be seen as a binding rule, but is rather a guiding principle.
Still, the history of these differing views is relevant to this Ar-
ticle’s argument. In particular, Story’s notion of comity is based
on the premise that foreign law need only be respected to the
extent that it is not prejudicial to the interests of the forum
state.50 Childress notes that Story’s original concern with sover-
eign interests has disappeared in U.S. jurisprudence, in which
ders in the United States on the basis of comity, see D. Marianne Blair, Inter-
national Application of the UCCJEA: Scrutinizing the Escape Clause, 38 FAM
L. Q. 547, 554–55 (2004).
43 One such limitation being the need for reciprocity. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U.S. 113, 131 (1895).
44 Paul, supra note 9.
45 Paul, supra note 9, at 10–11, 78 (“comity is regarded both as legally com-
pelled and discretionary”).
46 Hilton, 159 U.S. 113.
47 E.g., Asvesta v. Petrousas, 580 F.3d 1000, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009).
48 Except in relation to the issue of recognition of non-return orders.
49 In relation to the Abduction Convention see infra at II.A; in relation to the
Model Law, see infra at IVA.
50 Lorenzen, supra note 6, at 33–35; see alsoWatson, supra note 22, at 20–22.
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the doctrine of comity is treated as requiring application of for-
eign law without consideration of sovereign interests.51 Accord-
ingly, Childress argues that there is a need to restore the cen-
trality of sovereign interests and that reliance on the doctrine of
comity should be predicated on the use of governmental interest
analysis to expose and articulate the sovereign interests at
stake.52 As stated above, this Article will adopt this suggestion,
and, thus, the next section considers briefly how governmental
interest analysis methodology can be used in the current con-
text.
B. Governmental Interest Analysis and Comity
Disillusionment with traditional jurisdiction selection and me-
chanical choice of law rules led Currie to develop the governmen-
tal interest analysis approach to choice of law.53 This approach
is based on the premise that there are public interests at stake,
even in disputes between private individuals, and that govern-
ments have an interest in local law applying where the policy
that informed that law is engaged.54 Thus, a judge must deter-
mine what the policies behind the respective laws are, so that he
can conclude whether each state has an interest in its law being
applied.55Where this analysis reveals that only one of the states
has an interest, then the apparent conflict between the two laws
turns out to be false, and the law of the state that does have an
interest must be applied.56 But, the situation is not so simple
where there is a real conflict, and this situation is recognized as
the “Achilles’ heel” of the theory. Over the years, various ap-
51 Childress, supra note 2, at 60‒61. Thus, the rule adopted by some U.S.
courts, that foreign custody decrees, rendered by foreign courts with jurisdic-
tion, would only be refused recognition where they were inconsistent with the
strong public policy of the forum state. Blair, supra note 42, at 554. It should
be noted that statutory effect has been given to this policy by section 105 of the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. (UCJJEA), 9 U.L.A.
(Part 1A) 649 (1999); Blair, supra note 42, at 560–62.
52 Childress, supra note 2, at 78–79.
53 See Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws 190–94 (1963);
see generally PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS, & SYMEON C. SYMENOIDES,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 27–31 (5th ed., 2010).
54 Currie, supra note 53, at 189.
55 Id. at 184.
56 HAY ET AL., supra note 53, at 31.
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proaches have been suggested, including Currie’s solution of ap-
plying forum law, Baxter’s “comparative impairment” theory57
and other versions of functional analysis which weigh the com-
peting interests in different ways.58
While Currie’s theory has had limited influence on judi-
cial decision-making,59 it has had a deep impact on academic
writing in the field60 and, despite considerable criticism, is still
defended by many leading scholars.61 As already mentioned,
Childress has urged that interest analysis be employed in order
to determine when the doctrine of comity should be used.62 In-
deed, because the original notion of comity was rooted in sover-
eign interests, Currie’s interest analysis theory provides an ap-
propriate analytical tool for determining the scope of the doc-
trine. Indeed, some of the criticisms of interest analysis theory
do not seem to apply in the comity context. For example, the
claim that states do not have an interest in the outcome of dis-
putes between private parties is not tenable in this context, since
the doctrine of comity itself is based on the assumption that
states do have such interests.
Moreover, some of the practical problems of interest analysis
methodology are of less significance when interest analysis is be-
ing used to indicate whether the doctrine of comity should be a
relevant factor in interpreting an international instrument, or
in exercising discretion conferred by that instrument, and not in
the traditional context of determining which law should apply.
Thus, for example, the uncertainty caused primarily by the dif-
ficulty in identifying governmental sovereign interests63 is far
less important in the context of interpretation of international
conventions. Similarly, the limited nature of the inquiry in this
Article makes it possible to adopt a broad weighing of interests
approach to real conflicts.
57 William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV.
1 (1963).
58 HAY ET AL., supra note 53, at 45–51.
59 Id. at 114.
60 Id. at 37.
61 Id.
62 Childress, supra note 2, at 62. However, my analysis identifies sovereign
interests on the basis of policies, as in Currie’s theory, and does not suggest
any input from the Executive in ascertaining these interests, as does Childress.
Id at 67–68.
63 HAY ET AL., supra note 53, at 30 n.16; Morris, supra note 38, at 520.
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Childress argues that U.S. courts that have engaged in gov-
ernmental interest analysis to determine the scope of comity,
have taken inconsistent approaches, and that it is not always
clear whether courts are looking for a conflict between laws, pro-
ceedings, or policies.64 Furthermore, some courts have distin-
guished between different comity contexts.65 Thus, there is no
authoritative approach, in the United States, to the use of inter-
est analysis in determining the role of comity.
The analysis in this Article focuses on the policies of the two
states involved. It differs from a traditional governmental inter-
est analysis in that it expressly considers conflicting interests
within each state. Its starting point is the assumption that both
the forum state and the foreign state (i.e., the state that ren-
dered the judgment or whose law is applicable) have a shared
interest66 in deferring to the foreign state’s adjudication, appli-
cable law or judgment. This Article refers to this shared interest
as a “comity interest.” The forum state’s interest is essentially
one of maintaining good international relations, which has been
expressed by one author as “the fear of being seen to sit in judg-
ment on the courts of other nations and the fear of causing dip-
lomatic problems.”67 The foreign state’s interest is in having its
applicable law or decisions respected by the forum state without
review. Additionally, since the two international instruments on
which this Article focuses determine which state should adjudi-
cate in the main proceedings, the comity interests of the foreign
state also include deferral to its adjudication therein by the fo-
rum state, without review of its legal system.68
64 Childress, supra note 2, at 51–56.
65 E.g., legislative comity, executive comity, and adjudicative comity. Id. at 48–
55.
66 As assumed by Lorenzen, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
67 T. Folkman, Two Modes of Comity, 34 U. PA. J. INT’LL. 823, 826 (2013). This
comment was made in the context of the United States. There is no reason,
however, to assume that these concerns, which reflect the importance attached
to a positive international image, and cordial international relations with other
states, are unique to the United States. On the contrary, courts in less powerful
states, which are more dependent economically, and politically, on pleasing
others, are likely to be even more influenced by these considerations.
68 See e.g., Gross v. British Broadcasting Corp., 386 F.3d 224 (2d Cir. 2004)
(discussing the imposition of conditions on forum non conveniens dismissals,
and warning that courts should not impose conditions that may be viewed as
having the effect of undermining the considered policies of the transferee fo-
rum, because comity demands respect for these policies).
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However, in addition to the comity interests, it is also neces-
sary to take into account the substantive interests of each state
in relation to the subject matter of the dispute in question. While
the substantive interests of the states involved may be con-
sistent with their comity interests, there will inevitably be cer-
tain situations in which the substantive interests of one or both
states may diverge from their respective comity interests. These
substantive interests will considerably weaken, and may even
prevail over, the comity interests as described above. Accord-
ingly, the impact of these countervailing substantive interests
may lead to two scenarios. The first is where, in the circum-
stances that have evolved, the foreign state does not, in fact,
have a real interest in having its judgment recognized or its rel-
evant law applied without review. This lack of a real interest
automatically removes the rationale for the forum state’s inter-
est in respecting the foreign law or judgment, and so there is a
false conflict. The second scenario is where the substantive in-
terests of the forum state, which militate against deferral to the
foreign law or judgment, prevail over its comity interests, and so
there is a real conflict of interests with the foreign state.
In the first situation, there is clearly no room for use of comity,
as this will produce a result which is inconsistent with the inter-
ests of either state. Better, then, that the forum state should ap-
ply its own law. In the second scenario, the question is whether
the forum’s substantive interests should prevail over the foreign
state’s comity interest in having its law or judgment respected
without review. This Article uses a weighing-of-interests ap-
proach to answer this second question—an approach that in-
cludes consideration of both the comity interests and the sub-
stantive interests of each state. Where the answer is negative
(i.e., where the forum’s substantive interests do not prevail over
the foreign state’s comity interest), then comity is relevant and
the foreign law or judgment must be respected. But, where the
answer is positive, the substantive interests of the forum must
supersede and deference will not be extended to the foreign law
or judgment.
II. THE ABDUCTION CONVENTION
The first section in this part will explain briefly how the Ab-
duction Convention operates and the objectives that it is de-
signed to achieve. The second section will survey the ways in
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which the concept of comity has been used in Abduction Conven-
tion case law.
A. Mechanism and Objectives
The Abduction Convention mandates that the judicial or ad-
ministrative authorities in the state to which a child has been
wrongfully removed or retained—the requested state or the
state of refuge—to order the immediate return of an abducted
child to the state of his or her habitual residence—the requesting
state or the state of origin—prior to the abduction,69 unless one
of the narrow exceptions in the Convention is established.70
Ninety-three countries have now ratified the Abduction Conven-
tion,71 and around 2,000 applications to return abducted chil-
dren are made under the Convention each year.72 The Abduction
Convention expressly states that its objectives are as follows:
69 Speed is of the essence in Abduction Convention proceedings, and the aim is
to complete the proceedings within six weeks. See Abduction Convention, su-
pra note 17, art. 11.
70 The exceptions are as follows: (i) twelve months have passed since the date
of wrongful removal or retention and the child is settled in his new environ-
ment (“the passage of time and settlement exception”) id. art. 12(2), (ii) the left-
behind parent was not exercising custody rights at the time of removal or re-
tention or had agreed to, or subsequently acquiesced, in the removal or reten-
tion (“the consent or acquiescence exception) id. art. 13(1)(a), (iii) there is a
grave risk that return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm
or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation ( “the grave risk excep-
tion”) id. art. 13(1)(b), (iv) the child objects to being returned and has attained
an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of his
views (“the child objection exception”) id. art. 13(2), or (v) return of the child
would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested state
relating to protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms (“the human
rights exception”) id. art. 20.
71 Status Table, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L L., www.hcch.net/in-
dex_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=24 (last visited Feb. 2, 2015).
72 According to information provided by central authorities from sixty of the
then eighty-one signatories to the Convention, 1,965 applications were submit-
ted under the Convention worldwide in 2008, and return was ordered in forty-
six percent of cases. Eighteen percent of the applications were withdrawn, and
eight percent were still pending at the termination date of the survey. NIGEL
LOWE, A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF APPLICATIONS MADE IN 2008 UNDER THE
HAGUE CONVENTION OF 25 OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 6, 12 (2011), available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/abduct2011pd08ae.pdf.
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(a) To secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed
to or retained in any Contracting State; and
(b) To ensure that rights of custody and access under the law
of one Contracting State are effectively respected in other Con-
tracting States.73
The Preamble to the Abduction Convention explains that the
rationale behind these objectives is the belief that the best inter-
ests of children are paramount in custody matters.74 The objec-
tive of prompt return is based on the premise that the welfare of
children is best promoted by reversing the effect of abductions
as quickly as possible for three reasons.75 First, a prompt return
will negate the harm often caused to children who are suddenly
removed from their environment.76 Second, the knowledge that
immediate return will be ordered is likely to deter potential ab-
ductors.77 Third, the child’s interests can best be protected by
litigating the merits of the dispute in the forum conveniens,
which will usually be the place of the child’s habitual residence.78
Accordingly, the requested state is not permitted to consider the
merits of the custody dispute between the parents, and its role
is further limited to determining whether the conditions for ap-
plication of the Convention are met and, if so, whether one of the
exceptions applies.79 Although a prompt return will not promote
the child’s welfare in each case, any attempt to ascertain what
the child’s welfare requires automatically jeopardizes the objec-
tive of prompt return in every case.
The drafters, therefore, chose a mechanism of mandatory re-
turn, which requires the judicial or administrative authorities in
the requested state to order the return of a wrongfully removed
73 Abduction Convention, supra note 17, art. 1.
74 Id. Preamble.
75 Rhona Schuz, The Hague Child Abduction Convention and Children’s
Rights, 12 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 393, 398 (2002).
76 PEREZ-VERAREPORT, supra note 32, ¶ 25.
77 Id. at ¶¶ 16–17, 25.
78 It is important to keep in mind that the Abduction Convention is intended
to be “first aid” only, and that the merits of the custody dispute will be decided
in the courts of the requesting state after return of the child. See PEREZ-VERA
REPORT, supra note 32, ¶ 16.
79 The conditions are that the child has been wrongfully removed or retained,
he is not yet sixteen years old, and his habitual residence immediately prior to
the wrongful removal or retention was in a Contracting State. See Abduction
Convention, supra note 17, arts. 3–4. For exceptions, see PEREZ-VERA REPORT,
supra note 32, ¶ 113.
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or retained child without any investigation of the merits of the
case,80 subject to a number of narrowly drawn exceptions,81 com-
monly referred to as defenses. The burden is on the abductor to
prove the establishment of the exceptions and, in relation to two
of them,82 the U.S. legislature required a heightened evidentiary
burden of “clear and convincing evidence.”83 Where one of the
exceptions is established, the “gate is unlocked,” and the court
has discretion whether or not to return the child.84
The Preamble of the Abduction Convention leaves little doubt
that the central objective of the Convention is the protection of
the interests of children. Nonetheless, the reference to recogni-
tion of rights of custody and access in the objects of the Conven-
tion, together with the use of breach of custody rights attributed
to a person, institution, or other body as the trigger for the man-
datory return mechanism,85 shows that an additional objective
is the protection of the parental rights of the parent from whom
the child was taken—the “left-behind parent.” Restoration of the
status quo ante, via return of the child, thus also achieves justice
between the parents.86
An additional, albeit subsidiary, objective of mandatory return
is to uphold the rule of law. In other words, the abductor is not
allowed to gain any advantage as a result of his wrongdoing.87
But, the very fact that the drafters provided exceptions to man-
datory return shows that they understood that other policies,
and protection of children’s interests, in particular, should take
precedence over the adult-centric policies of justice between the
parents and upholding the rule of law.
80 Abduction Convention, supra note 17, art. 12.
81 PEREZ-VERAREPORT, supra note 32, ¶ 113.
82 The grave risk exception in Art 13(1)(b) and the human rights exception in
Art 20. Id.
83 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603(e)(2)(A).
84 PEREZ-VERAREPORT, supra note 32, ¶ 113.
85 Abduction Convention, supra note 17, art. 3
86 See e.g., FHU v. ACU, 48 A.3d 1130, 1147 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., 2012).
Stating that the Convention “seeks to right a wrong.”
87 PEREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 32, ¶ 71; see also, e.g., Re E, [2011] UKSC
27, [2012] 1 A.C. 144; RFamA 1855/08 Plonit v. Ploni, ¶ 23 (Aug. 4, 2008) (un-
published) (Isr.), available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/08/550/018/r03/08018550.r03.pdf; [INCADAT
cite: HC/E/IL 923].
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Finally, cooperation is an important element in the Abduction
Convention’s scheme.88 In particular, Contracting States are
obliged to designate Central Authorities,89 who are, in turn, re-
quired to “cooperate with each other and to promote cooperation
amongst the competent authorities in their respective states” in
order to achieve the objects of the Convention.90
B. The Abduction Convention and Comity
This section will survey five different ways in which the doc-
trine of comity has been referred to by courts in cases involving
the Abduction Convention. The first method uses comity in the
sense of reciprocity. The second uses comity to narrowly inter-
pret the exceptions and the third is the use of comity as a factor
in exercising the discretion that arises where one of the excep-
tions is established. The fourth concerns the impact of comity on
the practice of requiring undertakings. The fifth relates to recog-
nition of non-return orders of the requested state.
1. Reciprocity
Some judges have expressly relied on the reciprocal nature of
the Abduction Convention to support decisions to return ab-
ducted children to other Contracting States, so that those states
will reciprocate by returning children abducted from the judges’
own states.91 Even when this consideration is not expressed, it
88 PEREZ-VERAREPORT, supra note 32, ¶ 37.
89 Abduction Convention, supra note 17, art. 6.
90 Id. art. 7.
91 E.g., Souratagar v. Lee, 720 F.3d 96, 108 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We are also mindful
of the need for comity as ‘[t]he careful and thorough fulfillment of our treaty
obligations stands not only to protect children abducted to the United States,
but also to protect American children abducted to other nations—whose courts,
under the legal regime created by this treaty, are expected to offer reciprocal
protection.’”) (citing Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 242 (2d Cir. 1999)); DP
v. Commonwealth Cent. Authority (2001) 206 CLR 401 para. 155 (Kirby, J.,
dissenting) (“To the extent that Australian courts, including this Court, do not
fulfill the expectations expressed in the rigorous language of the Convention
and the Regulations, but effectively reserve custody (and residence) decisions
to themselves, we should not be surprised if other countries, noting what we
do, decline to extend to our courts the kind of reciprocity and mutual respect
which the Convention scheme puts in place. And that, most definitely, would
not, in the aggregate, be in the best interests of children generally and of Aus-
tralian children in particular.”); see also Duran v. Beaumont, 534 F.3d 142,
152–53 (2d Cir. 2008) (Wesley, J., dissenting).
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may well influence judicial decision making. Others have used
the concept of reciprocity to refer generally to the importance of
mutual respect between Contracting States,92 rather than to rec-
iprocity between two particular Contracting States.93 There is
some evidence that this concern is greater where the case is one
to which the Brussels II bis Regulation applies.94 This increased
concern is due to the close economic, social, and legal ties be-
tween the EU Member States, which go far beyond abduction
cases.95
2. To Support a Narrow Interpretation of the Exceptions
As explained above, the Abduction Convention contains a
number of exceptions to mandatory return. Most courts have in-
terpreted these exceptions restrictively, out of concern, that, oth-
erwise, the Convention would become “a dead letter” or ineffec-
tual.96 In relation to two of the exceptions, comity has been cited
as one of the reasons for the narrow interpretation and these will
be now considered in turn.
(a) The Grave Risk Exception
The grave risk exception applies where the abductor estab-
lishes that “there is a grave risk that [the child’s] return would
expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise
92 PEREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 32, ¶ 37 (referring to the need for coopera-
tion between Central Authorities, which is based on reciprocal rights and du-
ties).
93 See, e.g., Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth)
reg 1A(2)(c) (Austl.) (providing that the regulations are to be construed inter
alia “recognising that the effective implementation of the Convention depends
on the reciprocity and mutual respect between judicial or administrative au-
thorities (as the case may be) of convention countries.”).
94 Council Regulation 2201/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 338) (concerning jurisdiction and
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the
matters of parental responsibility). See e.g., Vigreux v. Michel [2006] EWCA
(Civ.) 630, [78]–[82] and Re F. (Abduction: Joinder of Child as Party) [2007]
EWCA (Civ.) 393, [2] (Thorpe L.J.) (Eng.).
95 For impact of political “europeanisation” considerations on the EC legislation
relating to cross-border family disputes, see KATERINA TRIMMINGS, CHILD
ABDUCTION WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION 9 (2013) and Peter McEleavy, The
Brussels II Regulation: How the European Community has Moved Into Family
Law, 51 INT’L&COMP. L.Q. 883, 893 (2002).
96 PEREZ-VERAREPORT, supra note 32, ¶ 34.
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place the child in an intolerable situation.”97 The concept of com-
ity has been used to justify a narrow interpretation of this ex-
ception, on the assumption that other Contracting States will be
just as willing and able to protect children as the requested
state, and it is therefore not appropriate to examine whether this
is indeed the case.98 According to this view, then, return can only
expose the child to a grave risk of harm or place him in an intol-
erable situation if circumstances outside the control of the re-
questing state exist, such as famine or war.99
(b) The Human Rights Exception
Article 20 of the Abduction Convention provides that return of
the child may be refused “if this would not be permitted by one
of the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”100 The
notion of comity between signatory states has been used as a
reason to reject claims invoking this exception. For example, in
the case of Caro v. Sher,101 where the Spanish law did not meet
the standards of due process in the United States,102 the court
justified its refusal to invoke the Article 20 defense on the basis
that there was no reason to prefer the jurisprudential precepts
of one Member State over that of another.103 The court also
pointed out that one of the objectives of the Convention was to
ensure mutual respect for rights of custody and access.104 Simi-
larly, an Israeli court has held that, in applying the Convention,
97 Abduction Convention, supra note 17, art 13(1)(b).
98 See e.g. Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 248–49 (2d Cir. 1999) (“In the ex-
ercise of comity . . . we are required to place our trust in the court of the home
country to issue whatever orders may be necessary to safeguard children who
come before it.”); Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d 392, 402 (2001) (citing Friedrich v.
Friedrich 78 F.3d 1060, 1068 (1996); In the Marriage of Gsponer, (1988) 12 Fam
LR 755 (Austl.); Murray v. Director, Family Services (Act), (1993) 16 Fam LR
982 (Austl.).
99 See, e.g. Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1068.
100 Abduction Convention, supra note 17, art 20.
101 Caro v. Sher, 687 A.2d 354 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996).
102 Because there would be a four-year delay in hearing the child’s relocation
petition. Id. at 361.
103 See also Escaf v. Rodriguez, 200 F. Supp. 2d 603, 614 (E.D. Va. 2002) (stat-
ing, in reliance on State Department legal analysis, that “Article 20 does not
contemplate that courts applying the provision must copy the due process safe-
guards provided in the petitioner’s country with those provided in the respond-
ent’s country or with some ideal notion of due process.”).
104 Id.
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it must be presumed that all Member States observe human
rights105 and that, therefore, it will normally only be possible to
invoke Article 20 successfully where there has been a change of
regime since the accession of the requesting state to the Conven-
tion. 106
3. In the Exercise of Discretion to Order Return Where an Ex-
ception has been Established
The fact that an exception to mandatory return has been
established does not automatically preclude return of the
child.107 Rather, it means that the court has the discretion as to
whether to return the child.108 This discretion is “at large,”109
and the Convention does not provide any guidelines regarding
its exercise. Some of the cases set out a list of relevant factors110
105 FamC (RG) 74430/99 Ploni v. Almonit (unreported, 14.12.1999). See also Re
S [2000] 1 FLR 454, 463 (Eng.). (arguing that it was not “appropriate to treat
Israel as a case separate and apart from the other signatories to the Hague
Convention because of the dual system available in that country.”) Id. (refer-
ring to the jurisdiction of religious courts in family matters); Cf. dissenting
judgment of Justice Steiner in the European Court of Human Rights decision
in Neulinger & Shuruk v. Switzerland, App. No. 41615/07 Eur Ct. H. R. (Jan
8, 2009) (casting doubt on the assumption of the majority that the mother’s
involvement in the child’s education would be protected by the Israeli author-
ities on the basis that traditional religious rules applied by the Israeli religious
courts are “sometimes significantly different from those with which we are fa-
miliar in Europe.”). This assertion is patently unfounded and demonstrates
complete ignorance as to the nature of the Israeli legal system and to the fact
that, in this case, the secular Family Court was seized of all matters relating
to the upbringing of the child.
106 FamC (RG) 74430/99 (citing BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, THE HAGUE
CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 174 (Oxford University
Press, 1999). Cf. Borisovs v. Kubiles, [2013] O.N.C.J. 85, para. 46 (Can.) (hold-
ing that the Article 20 exception was established in a case where the child had
been granted refugee status because of the father’s abuse—abuse that had not
been dealt with by the Latvian courts).
107 PEREZ-VERAREPORT, supra note 32, ¶ 113.
108 Id.; Re A (Minors) (Abduction: Acquiescence) [1992] 2 FLR 14, 28.
109 Re M (Children) (Abduction: Rights of Custody), [2008] 1 A.C. (H.L.) 1288
(Baroness Hale of Richmond) (appeal taken from England.) In Australia, the
discretion has been referred to as “unconfined except in so far as . . . a particu-
lar consideration is extraneous.” Kilah v. Department of Community Services,
(2008) 39 Fam LR 431, ¶ 28.
110 See, e.g. W v. W (Child Abduction: Acquiescence) [1993] 2 FLR 211, 219
(Eng.).
52 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:1
that includes welfare of the child, forum conveniens, and consid-
erations arising from the underlying policy of the Convention,
sometimes referred to as Convention considerations.111 Within
those purported Convention considerations, some courts have
specifically referred to comity as a relevant consideration, mili-
tating in favor of ordering return, despite the fact that one of the
exceptions has been established. The weight given to comity,
however, may well differ depending on which exception is appli-
cable. The interplay between three such exceptions and comity
considerations that influence discretion will now be considered.
(a) Passage of Time and Settlement
Article 12(2) provides that a court is not obliged to return the
child where twelve months have passed since the date of wrong-
ful removal or retention, and the child is settled in his new envi-
ronment.112 It is not clear from the wording of the Abduction
Convention whether, when this exception is established, there is
indeed discretion to order return. Most courts, however, have
held that there is such discretion,113 and comity has occasionally
been mentioned as one of the factors relevant to exercising this
discretion.114
(b) The Child Objection Exception
A court may refuse to order return where “the child objects to
being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity
at which it is appropriate to take account of his views.”115Comity
111 For detailed discussion, see RHONA SCHUZ, THE HAGUE CHILD ABDUCTION
CONVENTION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 257–61 (2013).
112 Abduction Convention, supra note 17, art. 12(2).
113 For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Re M (Children) (Abduction:
Rights of Custody), [2007] UKHL 55, [42]–[44], [2008] 1 A.C. (H.L.) 1288 (Bar-
oness Hale of Richmond) (appeal taken from Eng.) and Lozano v. Alvarez, 134
S. Ct. 1224, 1237 (2014) (Alito J., concurring). For an argument that this ap-
proach is misconceived, see Rhona Schuz, In Search of a Settled Interpretation
of Article 12(2) of the Hague Child Abduction Convention, 20 CHILD&FAM. L.Q.
64, 65 (2008).
114 E.g. Re S (A Minor) (Abduction), [1991] 2 FLR 1 at 24 (Eng.). See also,
F.H.U. v. A.C.U., 48 A.3d 1130, 1147 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., 2012) (justify-
ing its decision to return a settled child—even though the passage of time and
settlement exception was established—based on the need to give effect to an
international accord designed to ensure adjudication in the place of habitual
residence, despite the fact that it causes austere results)
115 Abduction Convention, supra note 17, art. 13(2).
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is sometimes mentioned as one of the Convention considerations
against which the court must balance the child’s wishes,116when
exercising its discretion in cases where the child objects to re-
turn.117
In the case ofRe T (Abduction: Child’s Objections to Return),118
Lord Justice Ward held that “in the particular and exceptional
circumstances of this case, the interests of the children in re-
maining here should not be sacrificed on the altar of comity be-
tween nation states.” This comment’s implication is that, in
other cases, the child’s interests should be so sacrificed. Indeed,
even where comity is not mentioned expressly, it may still be
seen as one of the Convention considerations taken into account
in deciding what weight ought to be placed on the views of the
child.119
In a recent British Columbia case,120 an interesting distinction
was drawn between cases in which the retention of the child
breached a court order, and those where retention simply
breached an agreement between the parties. The court took the
view that, while the expression of comity toward custody and ac-
cess rights under the laws of a Contracting State was one of the
foundations of the Convention, this policy consideration has less
force where there had not been a breach of a foreign court or-
der.121
116 E.g., Vigreux v. Michel [2006] EWCA (Civ) 630, [78]–[82]; JPC v. SMW &
Anor, [2007] EWHC (Fam) 1349, [50] (Eng.).
117 There is some confusion in the case law as to whether this discretion is
exercised in determining whether the exception is established, or in determin-
ing whether the child should be returned despite the fact that the exception is
established. There is not, however, any practical difference between the two
approaches, because, regardless, the court must decide how much weight to
place on the child’s objections. For detailed discussion, see SCHUZ, supra note
111, n. 319–22.
118 Re T (Abduction: Child’s Objections to Return), [2000] 2 FLR 192, 220
(Eng.).
119 See e.g. Re R (Child Abduction: Acquiescence) [1995] 1 FLR 716, 730-31 (per
Balcolme LJ) and Re W (Minors), [2010] EWCA (Civ) 520, [26] (Eng.). Indeed,
prior to the House of Lords decision in Re M (Children) (Abduction: Rights of
Custody), [2007] UKHL 55, [42]–[44], [2008] 1 A.C. (H.L.) 1288 (Baroness Hale
of Richmond) (appeal taken from Eng.). United Kingdom courts took the view
that Convention considerations should prevail, other than in exceptional cases.
120 R. (G.A.G.) v. W. (T.D.), [2013] BSCS 586, [86] (Can.).
121 Id. at [89].
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(c) The Consent or Acquiescence Exception
A court may refuse to order return where the abductor shows
that the left-behind parent had agreed to, or subsequently acqui-
esced in, the removal or retention.122 In such cases, comity is
sometimes mentioned as one of the relevant factors in exercising
the discretion to return the child, despite the fact that an excep-
tion has been established.123 Indeed, Baroness Hale, when com-
paring these defenses with the more child-centric “grave risk”
and “child objection” exceptions, voiced the following opinion:
“[i]n consent or acquiescence cases, on the other hand, general
considerations of comity and confidence . . . might point to a
speedy return so that [the child’s] future can be decided in her
home country.”124 The implication of Lady Hale’s words is that,
where one of the child-centric defenses is established, comity
should not be a relevant factor when exercising judicial discre-
tion.125
4. In Relation to Undertakings
This sub-section will start by explaining the development
of the practice of requiring undertakings in order to protect re-
turning children and then proceed to consider two main ways in
which some courts have used the doctrine of comity to limit the
use of undertakings and their utility.
(a) The Practice of Requiring Undertakings
The practice of making return orders subject to the provision
of undertakings by the applicant or imposition of conditions by
122 Abduction Convention, supra note 17, art. 13(1)(a). Consent and acquies-
cence are irrevocable since, by definition, the exception is only relied on where
the left-behind parent has reneged and seeks return of the child. SCHUZ, supra
note 111, at 251; Re A (Minors) (Abduction: Custody Rights) [1992] Fam. 106
(Eng.).
123 E.g. Re M (Children) (Abduction: Rights of Custody), [2007] UKHL 55, [42]–
[44], [2008] 1 A.C. (H.L.) 1288, para. 45 (Eng.); BT v JRT (Abduction: Condi-
tional Acquiescence and Consent) [2008] EWHC (Fam) 1169.
124 Re M (Children) (Abduction: Rights of Custody), [2007] UKHL 55, [42]–[44],
[2008] 1 A.C. (H.L.) 1288, para 45 (Eng.).
125 There is some evidence that this approach has been accepted in relation to
the child objection exception in the United Kingdom. See, e.g. AF V. MBF,
[2008] EWHC (Fam) 272 (Eng.); Re F (A Child), [2009] EWCA Civ. 416, [5]
(Eng.); De L v. H, [2009] EWHC (Fam) 3074 (Eng.); M v. B [2010] EWCA (Civ)
178 (Eng.); Re WF v. RJ [2010] EWHC (Fam) 2909 (Eng.); A, Petitioner [2011]
CSOH 215 (Scot.).
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the court,126 designed to protect the child, has developed mainly
in common law countries.127 Effectively, these ameliorative
measures are designed to neutralize any harm to which the child
might be exposed, or to make what would otherwise be an intol-
erable situation tolerable, and thus prevent the need to refuse
return under the Article 13(1)(b) grave risk exception.128 Exam-
ples of common undertakings are commitments by the left-be-
hind parent to pay the return expenses129 and to provide finan-
cial support and/or accommodation for the child and returning
abductor,130 pending a decision of the court in the country of
origin on these issues. Additionally, in cases where there are al-
legations of domestic violence, the abusive left-behind parent
may be required to undertake not to harass the returning abduc-
tor. Also, in some cases, the left-behind parent may be required
to undertake not to press criminal charges, to withdraw charges
that have already been brought,131 or to obtain assurances from
the prosecuting authorities132 in the requested state that crimi-
nal proceedings will not be instigated or will be discontinued.133
126 For convenience, the term “undertakings”will be used to include conditions.
127 For general discussion of this phenomenon, see SCHUZ, supra note 111, at
289–98.
128 Id. at 290.
129 The Court might otherwise require the abductor to cover the cost of return
expenses under Art 26 of the Convention. See generally, Rhona Schuz and Bin-
yamin Shmueli, Between Tort Law, Contract Law and Child Law: How to Com-
pensate the Left-Behind Parent in International Child Abduction Cases, 23
COLUM. J. GENDER&L. 64, 84 (2012).
130 E.g., Sonderup v. Tondelli 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) at para. 56 (S. Afr.); CA
4391/96 Ro v. Ro 50(5) PD 33 [1997] (Isr.).
131 E.g. Tabacchi v. Harrison, No. 99 C 4130, 2000 WL 190576, at * 14 (N. D.
Ill. 2000).
132 See Hague Conference on Private International Law, PERMANENT BUREAU,
Conclusions and Recommendations of the Fourth Meeting of the Special Com-
mission to Review the Operation of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Mar. 22–28, para. 5.2
(2011).
133 E.g., Sonderup v. Tondelli 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) at para. 52 (S. Afr.) (requiring
an order from the Court of British Columbia confirming that criminal proceed-
ings were no longer pending against the mother). In the Israeli case of RFamA
1855/08 RB v. VG, 8 April 2008 (Isr) [INCADAT cite: HC/E/IL 923], available
at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/08/550/018/r03/08018550.r03.pdf. The Su-
preme Court required, inter alia, that such assurances be obtained from the
prosecution authorities in France, where proceedings had already been com-
menced against the abducting mother. But, when there was a delay in obtain-
ing these assurances, the Israeli Supreme Court held that the child should be
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Finally, in some cases, the return order is conditioned upon ob-
taining a temporary custody order in favor of the returning ab-
ductor.134 The main reason for the evolution of the practice of
undertakings is that, often, the abductor is the mother, who was
the primary caretaker of the child before the abduction,135 ra-
ther than, as the drafters of the Convention had envisaged, a
noncustodial father.136
Some commentators, however, have claimed that undertak-
ings are of no real value,137 and it has been suggested that they,
“may simply be sophisticated forms of judicial conscience ap-
peasement.”138 Indeed, there is evidence to support the claim
that undertakings do not achieve their purpose of safeguarding
abducted children from harm.139 The main reason for this is that
undertakings are often not enforceable in the requesting
state.140 In particular, in civil law jurisdictions,141 the concept of
returned immediately. The child then disappeared and has not been seen dur-
ing the five years which have elapsed. The mother has now been convicted of
criminal child abduction for not returning the child to the father and sentenced
to five years imprisonment. CrimA 5463/11 RB v. State of Israel [2013].
134 E.g. Sonderup v. Tondelli 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) at para. 52 (S. Afr.); RFamA
1855/08 RB v. VG, 8 April 2008 (Isr) [INCADAT cite: HC/E/IL 923], available
at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/08/550/018/r03/08018550.r03.pdf.
135 In the 2008 Statistical Survey, 69 percent of abductors were mothers and
73 percent of abductors were the child’s primary caretaker or joint primary
caretaker. LOWE, supra note 72.
136 See SCHUZ, supra note 111, at 55.
137 See e.g., Merle Weiner, International Child Abduction and the Escape from
Domestic Violence, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 593 (2000).
138 Marilyn Freeman, Primary Carers and the Hague Child Abduction Conven-
tion (2001) INT’L FAM. L. J. 140, 146 (2001).
139 R. Hoegger, What If She Leaves? Domestic Violence Cases under the Hague
Convention and the Insufficiency of the Undertakings Remedy, 18 BERKELEY J.
GENDER L. & JUST. 181 (2003); Weiner, supra note 137.
140 Interviews with left-behind parents reveal that some had been advised by
their lawyers in advance to agree to the undertakings precisely because they
were not enforceable, and, ultimately, would amount to nothing. REUNITE
INTERNATIONAL, THE OUTCOMES FOR CHILDREN RETURNED FOLLOWING AN
ABDUCTION 33 (2003), available at: http://www.reunite.org/edit/files/Li-
brary%20-%20reunite%20Publications/Outcomes%20Report.pdf.
141 Even common law jurisdictions will not always enforce undertakings. E.g.,
Roberts v. Roberts, C.A. No. 95-12029-RGS, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4089, at
*46–48 (D. Mass. Feb. 27, 1998). For reference to correspondence between the
U.S. State Department and the Lord Chancellor’s Office in the United King-
dom in relation to British concerns that U.S. courts were not enforcing under-
takings, see Danaipour v. Mclarey, 286 F.3d 1, 22 (1st Cir. 2002).
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undertakings is unknown.142 Thus, the abductor is effectively
dependent on the left-behind parent’s willingness to keep his
word, or on the possibility of obtaining appropriate protection
quickly from the courts of the requesting state. The left-behind
parent is not always so trustworthy,143 and, quite often, the un-
availability of the protections that undertakings are meant to
afford was the reason for the abduction in the first place.144 The
undertakings problem is particularly acute in domestic violence
cases, both because of the likelihood that abusive persons will
not balk at violating their undertakings,145 and because of the
substantial risks of renewed violence.146 Indeed, one limited
study showed that, in all of the six cases in which undertakings
were given relating to violence or molestation, each of these un-
dertakings was violated.147
Some courts have addressed the unenforceability of undertak-
ings148 and required left-behind parents to prove the efficacy of
their undertakings.149 Moreover, various attempts have been
made to overcome the unenforceability of undertakings in re-
questing states. For example, the court of the requested state
might require the left-behind parent to obtain an order—known
as a mirror order—from the court of the requesting state, which
142 Per Baroness Hale and Lord Wilson in Re E, [2011] UKSC 27, [7] [2012] 1
A.C. 144; Christer Sjodin, Swedish Report in Special Focus: Enforcement and
Return of Access Orders, INT’L CHILD PROTECTION, Spring 2004, at 46.
143 E.g. PW v. AL, (2003) S.C.L.R. 478, [43] (Scot.), in which after return to
Australia, the court there reduced the sums of maintenance that the father
had undertaken to pay in the Scottish court. When the father refused to pay
even the reduced amount, the mother took the children back to Scotland. Chris-
ter Sjodin, Scottish Report in Special Focus: Enforcement And Return Of Access
Orders, INT’LCHILD PROTECTION, Spring 2004, at 65.
144 For example, the mother may have only abducted because she was unable
to obtain protection from the father’s violence. See Weiner, supra note 137, at
624–26.
145 E.g., Simcox v. Simcox, 511 F.3d 594, 600 (6th Cir. 2007) (suggesting that,
because the applicant had exhibited, “an arrogance, a need to be in control and
a tendency to act out violently,” there was doubt as to his willingness to abide
by the court’s undertakings. Id. See also, Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 220
(1st Cir. 2000) (taking into account the fact that the father had previously
breached court orders, when refusing return).
146 E.g. JEFFREY EDELSON ET AL, MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON BATTERED
MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN FLEEING TO THE UNITED STATES FOR SAFETY: A
STUDY OFHAGUE CONVENTION CASES 180–83 (2010).
147 REUNITE INTERNATIONAL, supra note 140, at 31.
148 E.g., McOwan v. McOwan [1994] FLC 92-451 (Austl.).
149 E.g., Simcox, 511 F.3d at 611.
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would contain undertakings parallel to those given to the court
of the requested state.150 Since the mirror order is made by the
court of the requesting state, the undertakings in that order will
be enforceable there. Additionally, communication between
judges in the two relevant states, via the Hague network of
judges,151 might provide the judge in the requested state with
information that enables him to make an informed decision as
to whether a child might safely be returned to the requesting
state. Nonetheless, as will be seen below, some courts have
taken the view that the doctrine of comity places severe limita-
tions on the practice of requiring undertakings—and on at-
tempts to ensure that such undertakings are enforceable.
(b) Using Comity as a Reason not to Check Enforceability of Un-
dertakings
Some courts have relied on the doctrine of comity as a
basis to assume that the requested state will enforce undertak-
ings, and as a reason to refuse to make inquiries to enable con-
firmation of the assumption.152 It is ironic that the concept of
comity has been invoked by courts in requested states to justify
their presumption that the undertakings will be honored,153 but
150 E.g., C v. C (Minor: P Rights of Custody Abroad) [1989] 2 All E.R. 465, 471;
Re G (a Minor) (Abduction) [1989] 2 FLR 475; Re W (Abduction: Domestic Vio-
lence) [2004] EWHC (Fam) 1247.
151 See generally, Hague Conference on Private International Law, PERMANENT
BUREAU, Emerging rules regarding the development of the International Hague
Network of Judges and draft general principles for Judicial communications,
including commonly accepted safeguards for direct judicial communications in
specific cases, within the context of the International Hague Network of Judges,
Prel. Doc. No 3A (July 2012), available at www.hcch.net/upload/wop/ab-
duct2011pd03ae.pdf; Rule 1.1–1.8 and discussion in SCHUZ, supra note 111, at
296–98.
152 E.g. Re K (Abduction: Physical Harm) [1995] 2 FLR 550 (quoting the non-
Convention case of Re M (Abduction: Non-Convention Country) [1995] 1 FLR
89); Karin Wolfe, A Tale of Two States: Successes and Failures of the 1980
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction in the
United States and Germany, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’LL. & POL’Y, 285, 331 (2000). (ar-
guing that the adequacy of the safeguards should not be checked because this
will lead to unequal treatment of different countries). See also Re E, [2011]
UKSC 27 (Eng.) (refusing to follow up unsatisfactory answers provided by for-
eign judges in order not to waste valuable judicial time).
153 E.g., RK v. JK, (Child Abduction: Acquiescence) [2000] 2 I.R. 416 (Ir.).
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requesting states have not used comity as a basis to enforce un-
dertakings that the requested state has required or imposed.154
(c) Using Comity to Restrict the Use of Undertakings and Mir-
ror Orders
U.S. courts have not accepted undertakings that require action
or enforcement by foreign authorities, on the basis that doing so
would violate international comity.155 For example, the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal inMaurizio stated that the trial court “over-
stepped its bounds” when it made a return order contingent on
the left-behind father providing an assurance from the Italian
government that it would not arrest or prosecute the returning
mother.156 Indeed, when agreeing to accept undertakings that
can be fulfilled by the left-behind parent, U.S. courts sometimes
expressly comment that these undertakings do not offend no-
tions of international comity because they do not require the in-
volvement of foreign authorities.157
Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has
rejected the practice of mirror orders, on the basis of the doctrine
of comity.158 The First Circuit stated that the practice of condi-
tioning return upon the making of an order by the court in the
requested state “would smack of coercion of the foreign court,”159
and that expecting the foreign court simply to copy and enforce
the order of the court of the requested state “offends notions of
international comity.”160
5. In relation to Recognition of Foreign Non-Return Orders
While the Abduction Convention requires the requested
state (i.e., the state of refuge) to give force to the judicial deci-
sions of the state of habitual residence (i.e., the requesting
154 Hoegger, supra note 140; Weiner, supra note 137.
155 Danaipour v. Mclarey, 286 F.3d 1, 22–23 (1st Cir. 2002). The judicial policy
reflects that of the U.S. State Department, which has declared that it “does not
support conditioning the issuance of a return order on the acquisition of [an]
order from a court in the requesting state.” See id.
156 Maurizio R v. LC, 201 Cal. App 4th 616, 644 (2011).
157 E.g. Kufner v. Kufner, 519 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2008); Krefter v. Wills, 623 F.
Supp. 2d 125 (D. Mass 2009); Wilchynski v. Wilchynski, No. 3:10-CV-63-FKB,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25903 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 18, 2010).
158 Danaipour, 286 F.3d at 22.
159 Id. at 23.
160 Id. at 25
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state),161 there is no parallel requirement for the latter state to
recognize decisions made under the Abduction Convention by
the requested state. Thus, if the requested state makes a no-re-
turn order, there is no obligation on the requesting state to rec-
ognize that decision.162 This issue is most relevant where the
left-behind parent counter abducts the child back to the request-
ing state after the non-return order, and the original abducting
parent requests that the child be returned to the state of refuge
(i.e., the original requested state) in reliance on the non-return
order, and subsequent custody order, in his or her favor. In cases
where the left-behind parent does not counter abduct the child,
he or she may be able to obtain an order from the courts of the
requesting state requiring the abductor to bring the child back,
or awarding the left-behind parent custody. Any such orders,
however, will have no practical effect,163 unless the abductor or
child leaves the state of refuge.164
One might expect that the doctrine of comity would require
giving deference to the non-return order of the foreign court. In-
deed, the Israeli Supreme Court in the case of P.R. v. T.A.E.165
ordered the return of children166who had been counter abducted
back to Israel, from Italy, following a non-return order by the
161 Abduction Convention, supra note 17, art. 3.
162 The U.S. case law uses the phrase “extending comity” to foreign decisions
interchangeably with the terms “recognizing” and “extending deference.” In or-
der to avoid confusion with the doctrine of comity, this Article uses the latter
two terms only.
163 See Transcript of Judge Mizdol’s Ruling, Ben-Haim v. Ben-Haim, No. FD
02-906-11 (NJ Super Ct Aug 25, 2011) (making orders, including an arrest war-
rant against the mother, that cannot be enforced while the mother remains in
Israel).
164 See Carrascosa v. McGuire, 520 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing a
mother, who had abducted the child to Spain, returned to the United States,
and was imprisoned for contempt of a U.S. court, which ordered her to bring
the child back to the United States).
165 RFamA 672/06 PR v. TAE, 61(3) PD 24.
166 This return was ordered despite the objections of the thirteen and eleven
year old children, on the basis of their lack of ability to understand the long
term implications of staying in Israel with the father, and the fact that their
wishes were not “dominant and of special force.” The aftermath of the case,
however, casts doubt on the correctness of the decision, since the mother suc-
cessfully obstructed the father’s attempts to visit the children in Italy. (per-
sonal communications to the author from the lawyer representing the father
and from a lawyer in the Israeli Central Authority)
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Italian courts on the basis of “deference to foreign courts.”167 Sig-
nificantly, the Israeli court gave effect to the Italian decision,
even though it expressed the view that the Italian court had not
applied the Hague Abduction Convention properly, because
there had not been any basis for invoking the grave risk excep-
tion. 168
In contrast, courts in North America have only extended com-
ity to foreign non-return orders after careful, detailed review of
the foreign decision, in order to ensure that the Abduction Con-
vention was properly applied,169 and, on a number of occasions,
refused to recognize such non-return orders where foreign courts
have, in their view, misapplied the provisions of the Hague Con-
vention.170 Indeed, in Asvesta v. Petrousas,171 in circumstances
almost identical to those in P.R. v T.A.E., the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit declined to recognize a Greek non-return
order, on the basis that the Greek court had wrongly focused on
the merits of the custody dispute.172 Accordingly, the Ninth Cir-
cuit did not order return of the child, who had been counter ab-
ducted by the father to the United States.
Similarly, in the case of Ben-Haim v. Ben-Haim, the Superior
Court of New Jersey declined to recognize an Israeli non-return
order, which was based on the father’s consent to or acquiescence
in the child’s staying in Israel.173 Reviewing the decision of the
majority of the Israeli Supreme Court,174 the U.S. court con-
cluded that an unexecuted agreement could not constitute con-
sent or acquiescence, and that, in any event, any consent could
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Pitts v. De Silva, [2008] O.J. No. 36 (Can Ont. Ct. App.) (QL); Diorinou v.
Mezitis, 237 F.3d 133, 142 (2001). This case was cited as supporting the prop-
osition that courts may give res judicata effect to foreign judgments on the ba-
sis of comity in the cross-border insolvency case of In re Metcalfe & Mansfield
Alternative Invs., 421 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
170 E.g. Asvesta v. Petroutsas, 580 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir, 2009); Carrascosa v.
McGuire, 520 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2008).
171 Asvesta v. Petroutsas, 580 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir, 2009).
172 Id.
173 Ben-Haim v. Ben-Haim, appeal Docketed No. FD 02-906-11 (NJ Super Ct
Aug 25, 2011)
174 RFamA 741/11 OB-H v. ShB-H, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/ver-
dictssearch/HebrewVerdictsSearch.aspx.
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not have been freely given, because the whole situation was
laden with duress.175
Likewise, in the case of Carrascosa v. McGuire,176 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit declined to extend defer-
ence to a Spanish non-return order, on the basis that the mother
had sole rights of custody under Spanish law and that restricting
her right to travel to Spain was a violation of her fundamental
human rights under Article 20 of the Abduction Convention.177
The Third Circuit held that the Spanish decision “departed from
the fundamental premise of the Hague Convention” by not ap-
plying New Jersey law to the determination of custody rights.178
III. INTEREST ANALYSIS OFUSE OF COMITY IN ABDUCTION
CONVENTION CASES
In this part, the application of interest analysis methodology
to Abduction Convention cases is carried out in three stages.
First, the interests of the states involved in international abduc-
tion cases are identified. Second, this section determines
whether the apparent conflicts between the interests of different
states in international abduction cases are false or real. Third,
this section analyzes whether, in cases where there is a real con-
flict of interest, reliance on comity does, in fact, achieve an ap-
propriate balance between those interests.
A. The Governmental Interests at Stake
1. Interests of the Requesting State
The impression given by courts that refer to comity in Abduc-
tion Convention cases is that the requesting state has a strong
interest in securing summary return of the child—an interest
that will be harmed by a non-return order.179 A closer examina-
tion, however, reveals that this assumption is too simplistic.
175 The mother had obtained a ne exeat order, preventing the father from leav-
ing Israel. The fact that the mother had this order revoked, pursuant to the
unsigned agreement, was the main basis of the decision of the majority in the
Israeli Supreme Court that the unsigned agreement did constitute consent or
acquiescence.
176 Carrascosa v. McGuire, 520 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2008).
177 Id. at 261.
178 Id. at 263.
179 See e.g., cases cited supra, at note 99.
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First, the use of the term “requesting state” is liable to be mis-
leading because the left-behind parent, and not the requesting
state, is the applicant in the proceedings.180 Even the fact that
the Central Authority of the requesting state is supporting the
application does not mean anything other than that the basic
conditions for applicability of the Convention appear to apply—
the Central Authority has no discretion in the matter at this
point.181
Second, while, in many cases, the return of the child is re-
quired by substantive policies of the requesting state,182 there
are cases where some, or all, of these policies will not apply.183
Moreover, in some situations, return of the child might be incon-
sistent with substantive policies of the requesting state. For ex-
ample, in cases where the left-behind parent has abused the
child or abductor, returning the victims to an abusive situation
is inconsistent with the policy of combatting domestic vio-
lence.184
Third, in some cases, the connection of the child with the re-
questing state may not be strong. While the requirement that
the child was habitually resident in that state was designed to
indicate such a connection, shifting interpretations of the con-
cept of “habitual residence”185 mean that the connection is not
180 In Australia, the requested state is the applicant. See SCHUZ, supra note
111, at 45.
181 For example, the U.S. Central Authority has supported applications made
by left-behind parents who appear to be living in the United States illegally.
See e.g., FamA (Dist TA)1382/04 Plonit v. Ploni, Nevo, 1/5/06 (allowing an ap-
peal against a return order, inter alia, because the applicant had subsequently
left the United States, as he was there illegally).
182 Policies such as child protection, deterring abductions, and the rule of law.
183 Such as where the removal was with consent. For a general discussion of
the Abduction Convention’s treatment of consensual removals as wrongful, see
SCHUZ, supra note 111, at 261–62.
184 For a discussion of these policies, see U.N. Secretary-General, Intensifica-
tion of Efforts to Eliminate all Forms of Violence against Women: Report of the
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/65/208 (Aug. 2, 2010), available at www.un-
hcr.org/refworld/docid/4cf4e25a2.html; See generallyHague Conference on Pri-
vate International Law, PERMANENT BUREAU, Domestic and Family Violence
and the Article 13 ‘grave risk’ exception in the operation of the Hague Conven-
tion of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction:
A Reflection Paper, Prel. Doc. No. 9, (May 2011), available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/abduct 2011pd09e.pdf.
185 See generally Rhona Schuz, Disparity and the Quest for Uniformity in Im-
plementing the 1980 Hague Abduction Convention, 9 J. COMP. L. 3, 6–10 (2014).
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always apparent. Particularly, the result of the “parental inten-
tion” approach adopted in most U.S. Circuits186 means that a
child may be found to be “habitually resident” in a state with
which he did not have a strong connection at the time of the
wrongful removal or retention.187 In some of these cases, there
will be a strong connection between the left-behind parent and
the requesting state, such as nationality, which appears to sup-
port the assumption that the requesting state has a strong in-
terest in the return of the child. The strength of this interest,
however, evaporates upon inspection, because the central objec-
tive of the Abduction Convention is to protect children who are
the primary victims of the Abduction—not to enforce parental
rights.
Fourth, the return of a child may place a burden on the re-
sources of the legal system, law enforcement authorities, and so-
cial services in the requesting state. For example, any litigation
in the requesting state, subsequent to the return of the child,
will involve the court system, and relocation disputes are partic-
ularly lengthy and expensive. Additionally, the returning child
and abducting parent may require financial support from gov-
ernmental welfare services. Sadly, in cases of domestic violence,
law enforcement resources may be also required to ensure the
safety of the returning child and abducting parent. While these
resource considerations alone cannot determine whether the re-
questing state has an interest in the return of the child, they can
strengthen other, more substantive reasons for casting doubt on
the interest of the requesting state—such as cases where the
child only has a weak connection with that state, or cases where
186 Under the “parental intention” approach, the child may remain a habitual
resident in a country where he has not lived for many years, if one of his par-
ents has not abandoned the intention to return there. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Tenorio,
392 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2004). For the development of this approach, see
SCHUZ, supra note 111, at 188–89.
187 See e.g., Re F (A Minor) (Child Abduction) [1992] 1 FLR 548 (Eng.), (where
a child had only lived in Australia for three months). See also Ruiz v. Tenorio,
392 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that children were habitually resident
in the United States, even though they had lived in Mexico for the past three
years, simply because mother had not intended to abandon the United States).
Compare with the factual, child-centric approach adopted in some circuits (e.g.,
Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981 (6th Cir. 2004)) by the European Court of Jus-
tice, (Case C – 49710PPU, Mecredi v. Chaffe, 2012 E.C.R. 22) and by the UK
Supreme Court (In the Matter of A Children (AP) [2013] UKSC 60).
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the return seems inconsistent with the policy of preventing do-
mestic violence.
In the light of the above four reasons for questioning the inter-
est of the requesting state, there will be cases where the real
interest of the requesting state is to adjudicate the merits of the
custody dispute, rather than to secure that child’s immediate re-
turn. Indeed, empirical evidence shows that courts in requesting
states quite often allow returning abductors to relocate back to
the state of refuge (i.e., the requested state).188 Thus, in these
cases, the interest of the requesting state is to determine where
the child should live, rather than that he should permanently
return to that state.
In the past, it was not practical to separate adjudication from
return because the court in the requesting state could not decide
on the merits of the dispute without the physical presence in
that jurisdiction of the abducting parent and the child. With
modern technological means, such as video conferencing and sat-
ellite links,189 however, it is possible for the court in the request-
ing state to hear the substantive dispute, without the child and
abducting parent returning.190 Indeed, in abduction cases be-
tween European Community (“EC”) states, the Brussels II Reg-
ulation191 provides that, where a non-return order is made on
the basis of one of the exceptions in Art. 13 of the Abduction Con-
vention, the requesting state retains jurisdiction to determine
the merits of the case.192 This option does not exist, however, in
non-EC states. Nonetheless, in a few cases where the courts in
188 REUNITE RESEARCH UNIT, THE OUTCOME FOR CHILDREN RETURNED
FOLLOWING AN ABDUCTION 37 (Sept. 2003), available at www.reu-
nite.org/edit/files/Library%20-%20reunite%20Publications/Outcomes%20Re-
port.pdf [hereinafter REUNITEOUTCOMES STUDY].
189 See e.g. Re A (Custody Decision after Maltese Non-Return Order) [2006]
EWHC 3397 (Eng.).
190 It is also possible to obtain a welfare report on the child through Interna-
tional Social Services or by sending social workers to the country where the
child is currently living—as was done in an Israeli case concerning a child who
was living in Sweden—whose father refused to bring him to Israel as originally
agreed. See FamC 10706499 KL v. DSh (Dec. 30, 2003).
191 Council Regulation 2201/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 338) 1 (EC) (concerning juris-
diction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial mat-
ters and the matters of parental responsibility).
192 Id. art. 10. If the requesting state decides that that child should be returned,
that decision trumps the earlier non-return order. Id. art. 11(8).
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the requesting state have already been seized of the custody dis-
pute, a similar result has been achieved by staying the return
order until the final determination of the custody dispute.193
In summary, the automatic assumption that the requesting
state has a strong interest in the return of the child is miscon-
ceived. Particularly, in cases where the child’s habitual resi-
dence is not obvious or where there exists a basis for invoking
one of the exceptions, the interest of the requesting state in the
child’s return may be quite weak or nonexistent.
2. Interests of the Requested State
A number of interests of the requested state may be en-
gaged in the child abduction scenario. In the past, it was as-
sumed that the requested state would have an interest in decid-
ing the substantive custody dispute itself, because of its inherent
interest in protecting children subject to its sovereignty and ap-
plying the best-interests-of-the-child standard, which, under
most domestic laws, is the paramount consideration in issues
concerning children.194Where the abductor was a national of the
requested state, the state’s interest in supporting that parent
would also militate toward local adjudication.195 Thus, the draft-
ers of the Abduction Convention took the view that the only way
to overcome these interests was to mandate immediate return
subject to narrowly defined exceptions.196 Indeed, the suggestion
to include a general public policy exception was rejected pre-
cisely because of concerns that such an exception might give re-
quested states discretion to give precedence to local interests.197
The assumption about the interest of requested states, how-
ever, has largely been stood on its head, at least in some Con-
tracting States. Today, courts and others seem to take the view
that states actually have an interest in returning abducted chil-
dren so that the international community will consider those
states to be compliant with the Convention. For example, while
193 See e.g., F v. M and N, (Abduction: Acquiescence: Settlement) [2008] EWHC
(Fam) 1525; JPC v. SMW, [2007] EWHC (Fam) 1349.
194 Adair Dyer, Report On International Child Abduction By One Parent (Pre-
lim. Doc. No. 1 of Aug. 1978), in 3 HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE
INTERNATIONALLAW, ACTS ANDDOCUMENTS OF THEFOURTEENTH SESSION 12, 22
(1982).
195 Id. at 20.
196 BEAUMONT&MCELEAVY, supra note 106, at 21.
197 Id. at 22‒23.
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devising a project for mediation in abduction cases, Reunite198
stated that “it was of paramount importance that the United
Kingdom’s reputation as an enthusiastic and reliable upholder
of the Hague Convention should not be undermined.”199 Like-
wise, in the first case between England and South Africa, when
declining to give leave against the trial judge’s refusal to return
under Article 13(1)(b), on the basis of the father’s history of vio-
lence, Lady Justice Butler-Sloss ordered that a copy of the deci-
sion be sent to the South African Central Authority, with an ex-
planation that this was an unusual decision, and was not repre-
sentative of the English approach to the Abduction Conven-
tion.200
Similarly, the an analysis of over a decade of Israeli courts’
decisions under the Abduction Convention, which show that for-
eign left-behind parents fare much better than applicants of Is-
raeli origin,201 may be partly explained by the fact that Israeli
courts are keener to order return in cases involving foreign ap-
plicants, out of concern for their own international image.202
These examples may simply reflect the “comity interests” of
the requested states,203 and it is likely that consistent failure to
comply with the Convention will detrimentally affect the inter-
national reputation of requested states.204 Indeed, some have
even proposed to levy economic sanctions on such noncompliant
198 Reunite is a prominent charity, which engages in research and provides
support for those involved in child abduction cases.
199 REUNITE INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION CENTRE, MEDIATION IN
INTERNATIONAL PARENTAL CHILD ABDUCTION, THE REUNITE MEDIATION PILOT
SCHEME 7 (2006), available at http://www.reunite.org/edit/files/Library%20-
%20reunite%20Publications/Mediation%20Report.pdf.
200 Re M (Abduction: Leave to Appeal) [1999] 2 FLR 550.
201 See SCHUZ, supra note 111, at 60.
202 Some support for this hypothesis can be found in Crim.C. (Dist BSH)
8150/08 State of Israel v. RB, Nevo, 16/6/11, in which the judge, when sentenc-
ing the mother, who had been found guilty of disobeying a court order to return
her child to Belgium following the child’s disappearance, remarked that her
conduct, which had prevented the enforcement of the decisions of the Israeli
and foreign courts, had harmed the status of Israel as a state where law ruled.
203 See definition of comity interests, supra at I.B.
204 Indeed, the U.S. State Department prepares an annual report on states that
fail to comply with the Convention, in accordance with ¶ 11611 of ICARA. See
Caitlin Bannon, The Hague Convention On The Civil Aspects Of International
Child Abduction: The Need For Mechanisms To Address Noncompliance, 31
B.C. THIRDWORLD L.J. 129, 150‒53 (2011).
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states.205 But, the apparent equation of compliance with order-
ing return is problematic. As explained above,206 the Convention
does contain exceptions, which “are as much a part of the philos-
ophy of the Convention as prompt return and respect for rights
of custody and access between Contracting States.”207 Thus, re-
fusal to return, in cases where one of the exceptions is estab-
lished, is actually compliance with the Convention—not depar-
ture therefrom.208
It may be an unfortunate consequence of the excellent statis-
tical surveys carried out on behalf of the Permanent Bureau of
the Hague Conference on Private International Law,209 which
give outcomes for each Member State, that compliance is meas-
ured by return rate. This is problematic at a technical level as
well as a substantive level. On the technical level, in countries
with relatively few cases, the figures are not statistically signif-
icant. For example, in a country which has only ten cases per
year, the decision in each case affects the return rate by 10 per-
cent. On the substantive level, a preoccupation with statistics
obscures the truth that the success of the Abduction Convention
is not determined by how many children are returned, but
whether return is being ordered in those cases in which the chil-
dren should indeed be returned.210
Thus, we may conclude that, while the requested state does
indeed have a comity interest in being compliant with the Con-
vention, compliance cannot per se be equated with the rate of
return orders issued. Rather, a state’s interest is only engaged if
the case is indeed one in which the child should be returned un-
der the Convention. Accordingly, taking into account the inter-
est in compliance in interpreting the Convention provisions, in
205 Id. at 158–61.
206 See Part II.A.
207 Per Family Court of Australia in State Central Authority v. Papastravrou,
[2008] Fam LR 1120 [147] (Austl.). See also R.M. v. J.S., 2012 ABQB 669 (Can.)
(“Article 13 is part of the Hague Convention. It has to have a purpose. It cannot
simply be ignored.”) (Comment of Ontario Court of Appeal).
208 JLM v. Director-General NSW Department of Community Services, [2001]
HCA 39, 43–44 (Austl.).
209 See LOWE, supra note 72.
210 Rhona Schuz, The Hague Child Abduction Convention: Family Law and
Private International Law 44 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 771 (1995). A similar com-
ment was made by Professor William Duncan, then Secretary-General of the
Hague Conference, at the opening session of the Sixth Special Commission in
June 2011. (Author’s personal notes).
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order to determine whether the child should be returned, is cir-
cular reasoning.
Furthermore, the requested state has a moral, and often a le-
gal, duty to take reasonable steps to protect a child under its
jurisdiction from harm, even if the child is only temporarily
within that state’s jurisdiction.211 That state has an interest in
carrying out this duty to protect that may prevail over its comity
interest. Indeed, the notion that comity and reciprocity are out-
weighed by the welfare of the child212 is expressed in the English
common law rule that foreign custody decisions cannot be en-
forced.213 While, of course, this rule is not applicable in Abduc-
tion Convention cases, it does not mean that this state interest
does not exist. Rather, in cases that are properly within the
scope of the Abduction Convention, other interests prevail.
Nonetheless, this sovereign interest may be a relevant factor in
determining the scope of the obligation to return under the Con-
vention, namely in interpreting and applying the exceptions,
and in exercising discretion where one of these exceptions has
been established.
211 Under the general doctrine of parens patriae or specific legislation.
212 FAWCETT, supra note 33, at 1130.
213 McKee v. McKee, [1951] A.C. 352 (P.C.) (appeal taken from S.C.C.). Simi-
larly in the United States, traditionally, foreign custody awards were readily
subject to modification on the ground of change of circumstances. A Shapira,
Private International Law: Aspects of Child Custody and Child Kidnapping
Cases, in RECUEIL DES COURS 129, at 185; HAY ET AL., supra note 53, at 770.
Moreover, comity would not be extended to foreign custody determinations
where the foreign court did not apply the best interests of the child standard.
Blair, supra note 42, at 554. Under § 8(b) of the UCCJA, the rule preventing
modification of a custody decree following wrongful removal or retention did
not apply where exercise of such jurisdiction was required in the interests of
the child and, thus, comity was not extended to foreign custody determinations
where it could be shown “that conditions in the custodial household would be
harmful to the children.” Hovav v. Hovav, 458 A.2d 972 (Pa. 1983). But, the
possibility of refusing comity to foreign custody orders has been considerably
restricted by § 105 of the UCCJEA, Blair, supra note 42, under which courts
are obliged to recognize and enforce custody determinations of foreign states,
unless the “child custody law of a foreign country violates fundamental princi-
ples of human rights.” In order to reconcile this requirement with the state’s
interest in protecting the child, it is necessary to invoke the exception in cases
of domestic violence, as suggested by Blair, supra note 42, at 565–77, or to
expand creatively the emergency jurisdiction granted under the Act. Id. at
577–78.
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B. False Conflicts
This Article will now analyze the ways in which courts in the
United States, and other Contracting States have relied on the
doctrine of comity in Abduction Convention cases,214 in the light
of the theoretical basis of the comity doctrine, the objectives of
the Abduction Convention, and the respective comity and sub-
stantive interests of the requesting and requested states, identi-
fied in Part III.A. The current section will discuss the use of com-
ity in four contexts in which there is unlikely to be a real conflict
between the interests of the two states: (1) where comity is used
in the sense of reciprocity, (2) where the passage of time and set-
tlement exception has been established, (3) where a mature child
objects to return, and (4) where there has been consent or acqui-
escence by the left-behind parent.
1. Reciprocity
As seen above, courts sometimes invoke the concept of reci-
procity to support interpreting the Convention in a way that re-
sults in a return order.215 However, requested states do not,
when deciding particular cases, take into account the return rec-
ord of the requesting state, either generally or in relation to ab-
ductions from that state. Moreover, no mechanism presently ex-
ists for imposing sanctions against states that fail to implement
the Convention properly.216 Thus, there is no basis for any re-
quested state to assume that its failure to return abducted chil-
dren, in accordance with the Abduction Convention, will result
in refusal of other Contracting States to return children ab-
ducted from that state. Furthermore, non-return of a child in a
particular case is not a breach of the mutual trust between the
signatory states, so long as the provisions of the Convention
have been interpreted and applied properly, in the light of the
objectives of the Convention and other relevant legal norms.
Thus, reference to reciprocity of returns in interpreting the Con-
vention is misguided.
214 As discussed supra, in Part II.B.
215 See supra at II.B.1.
216 The idea that the Permanent Bureau should monitor compliance was re-
jected at the Sixth Special Commission Meeting in January 2012. See Protocol
of Meeting No. 23 of the Sixth Special CommissionMeeting (on file with author)
and author’s notes of that meeting. For a discussion of bills introduced into the
U.S. Congress that would impose economic and other political sanctions
against noncompliant countries, see Bannon, supra note 204, at 156 et seq.
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While both requested and requesting states have an interest
in reciprocity, generally,217 the existence of this general interest
does not help to determine the correct application of the Conven-
tion in a particular case. Accordingly, since both states’ interests
are in proper application of the Convention, using the concept of
reciprocity of returns as a factor in interpreting the provisions of
the Convention does not per se promote the interest of either
state.
2. Exercise of Discretion
Where the settlement, child objection, consent, or acqui-
escence exceptions have been established, there is no conflict of
interests between the two states for a number of reasons. First,
in these exceptional situations, non-return is not noncompliance
with the Convention.218 Second, non-return does not ipso facto
imply disrespect for the foreign decision, or lack of confidence in
the legal system of the foreign state. The reasons for this are
that the establishment of an exception is usually based on a sig-
nificant change in the situation that existed at the time of the
unlawful removal or retention, and that exceptions reflect sub-
stantive policies, which are shared by both states. A brief exam-
ination of each of the three relevant exceptions will illustrate
this point.
(a) Passage of Time and Settlement (Article 12(2))
Where a year has passed and the child has become settled, the
fundamental change in circumstances that has occurred since
the wrongful removal or retention has made the foreign law or
legal decision largely irrelevant. Thus, the requested state may
well become the forum conveniens for deciding the custody dis-
pute. Therefore, the common interest of both states in protecting
217 The difference between general and specific reciprocity can be seen in Israeli
case law, which holds that the requirement of reciprocity in the Enforcement
of Judgments Law 1958 refers to general reciprocity. Accordingly, an English
judgment ordering maintenance payments was enforced because England gen-
erally enforces Israeli judgments, even though, at that time, England did not
enforce maintenance judgments at common law because they were not final.
C.A. 619/89 Casson v. Casson PD 45(2) 656 [1991] (Isr.).
218 See supra at II.A.
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a child who has become settled in the requested state,219 and, in
some cases, states’ common interest in having the case decided
in the forum conveniens, must prevail over any interest of the
requesting state in respect for its law or judgment.220 Lady
Hale’s comment that, the farther away one gets from speedy re-
turn, the less weight should be given to Convention considera-
tions such as comity, supports this view.221As such, only in cases
where returning a settled child will not prejudice his or her wel-
fare should considerations of comity be taken into account.
(b) Child Objections (Article 13(2))
Where a mature222 child objects to her return, allowing comity
to override the objections would ignore the fact that the right of
the child to have appropriate weight attached to her views is en-
trenched in Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child.223 While the child’s views are not always
determinative,224 it is difficult to see how comity, instead of fac-
tors relating to the particular child, is relevant in determining
the weight to be attached to the child’s views.225 Thus, if the
219 See PEREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 32, ¶ 107 (“after a child has become
settled in its new environment, its return should take place only after an ex-
amination of the merits of the custody rights exercised over it . . .”).
220 In a Canadian case, the left-behind parent’s claim that the refusal to return
on the basis of Art 12(2) did not give effect to comity was rejected because most
of the evidence relating to the child’s best interests could be obtained in Can-
ada. Kubera v. Kubera, (2010) 317 D.L.R. 4th 307 (Can. B.C. C.A.).
221 ReM (Children) (Abduction: Rights of Custody), [2007] UKHL 55, [42]- [44],
[2008] 1 A.C. (H.L.) 1288 (Baroness Hale of Richmond) (appeal taken from
Eng.).
222 The Convention does not give any age limit. For discussion of the way in
which courts have interpreted the requirement of age and maturity, see SCHUZ,
supra note 111, at 323–27.
223 Convention on the Rights of the Child [CRC] art. 12, opened for signature
Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 44. The CRC has been ratified by all the signa-
tories of the Abduction Convention, except the United States. Thus it should be
considered part of the policy of both the requesting and requested states—unless
one of the parties is the United States. For the view that because of its wide-
spread acceptance, the CRC has become part of customary international law
and so may be used in US courts, see Linda D. Elrod, "Please Let Me Stay":
Hearing The Voice of The Child in Hague Abduction Cases , 63 OKLA. L. REV.
663, 672 (2010-2011).
224 ReM (Children) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2007] UKHL 55, at [46].
225 See e.g., Desilva v. Pitts, 481 F.3d 1279, 1286 (10th Cir. 2007) (“a court must
not focus solely on the general goal of the Convention—to protect children from
the harmful effects of wrongful removal—but must also carefully determine
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child is sufficiently mature and her objections are sufficiently
valid and strong, then those objections should be determina-
tive—notwithstanding the mandatory return policy of the Con-
vention—unless there is some other countervailing reason to the
contrary.226 Moreover, refusing to order return on the basis of
the child’s objections cannot in any way be seen as an expression
of lack of confidence in the legal system of the requesting state
on the part of the requested state.
Indeed, U.K.227 and U.S. courts have not taken into account
comity considerations in cases of children’s objections in recent
years.228 In one U.S. case, the court expressly stated that it
would not exercise its discretion to order return because the chil-
dren were well settled in a healthy environment. The court rea-
soned that return, in this case, would be inconsistent with the
Convention’s goals of treating the interests of abducted children
with “paramount importance” and protecting abducted children
“from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or reten-
tion.”229 Furthermore, another U.S. court has recently held that
“[t]he purpose of the mature child exception is to give a voice to
a child who has attained a certain age and maturity, even if
those wishes run counter to the lofty public policy purposes for
which the Convention was adopted.”230
The argument that the requesting state has an interest as the
appropriate forum to consider the child’s wishes misses the
point; the child objects to the very act of being returned. This
that the particular child ‘has obtained an age and degree of maturity at which
it is appropriate to take account of its views.’”) (quoting Blondin v. DuBois, 189
F.3d 240, 247 (2d Cir. 1999).
226 See Re R (Child Abduction: Acquiescence) [1995] 1 FLR 716, 734 (Millett
LJ) (Eng.).
227 E.g., ReW (Minors), [2010] EWCA (Civ) 520, [26] (Eng.).
228 De Silva v. Pitts, 481 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2007); Vasconcelos v. Batista, 512
F. App’x. 403 (5th Cir. 2013). But, in some cases, comity and other “Convention
considerations” influence the court’s narrow approach to the requirements of
age and maturity and to its assessment of the strength and validity of the
child’s objections. See generally, Rhona Schuz, Protection or Autonomy—The
Child Abduction Experience, in THE CASE FOR THE CHILD—TOWARDS THE
CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW AGENDA 269–308 (Ya’ir Ronen & Charles W. Green-
baum, eds., 2008).
229 Ramirez v. Buyausakas, No. 11- 6411, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24899, at *62
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2012) (quoting from the Preamble to the Abduction Conven-
tion).
230 Vujicevic v. Vujicevic, No. C13- 0204RSL, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82110, at
*16–17 (W.D. Wash. June 11, 2013).
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argument, however, could support a legal regime that separates
return from adjudication, and thus enables the requesting state
to decide the substantive custody dispute, while simultaneously
allowing the child to remain in the requested state pending the
custody decision.231 Such a regime seems to maximize the inter-
ests of both states. The requested state protects the participation
rights of the child within its jurisdiction, and the requesting
state adjudicates a dispute concerning a child who was habitu-
ally resident in its jurisdiction prior to the abduction. But, in
fact, this conclusion is dependent on the availability of a mecha-
nism to allow the requesting state to ascertain and give proper
weight to the child’s views in determining the substantive cus-
tody issues, when the child is physically in another country.232
The problem is that any attempt by the requested state to check
whether the requesting state has such a mechanism is liable to
violate the comity interests of the requesting state in not having
its legal system subject to scrutiny by another state.
(c) The Consent or Acquiescence Exception
Where there has been consent or acquiescence by the left-be-
hind parent, non-return should not be seen as lack of deference
to the requesting state. Non-return is, in such a case, a direct
result of the left-behind parent’s waiver of his or her rights. In-
deed, the Convention’s treatment of removals carried out with
the prior consent of the left-behind parent is anomalous. The
main justification for inclusion of consensual removals within
the Convention scheme is that such inclusion makes it possible
to order return of the child where his removal from his natural
environment is harmful to him, despite the consent of the left-
behind parent.233 In other words, the scope of the Convention
has been widened in order to protect children who are harmed
by a consensual removal. However, where the consensual re-
moval has not caused them harm, there is no reason to order
231 This situation can occur in some cases of non-return under the Brussels II
bis Regulations. Council Regulation 2201/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 338) (concerning
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial
matters and the matters of parental responsibility).
232 See warning in NIGEL LOWE, ET AL., THE NEW BRUSSELS II REGULATION: A
SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONALMOVEMENT OF CHILDREN 32–33 (2005).
233 For detailed analysis of the Convention’s approach to consensual removals,
see SCHUZ, supra note 111, at 261–62.
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return, and it is, therefore, difficult to see how comity can be a
relevant factor in exercising the discretion.
Moreover, there is no conflict of sovereign interests in consent
exception cases, because, at least where consent was given be-
fore the removal or retention, the “abduction” does not violate
the law or substantive policies of the requesting state.234 Also, it
is not clear that the requesting state retains an interest in adju-
dicating the merits of the dispute where the left-behind parent
has waived his right thereto.235 Therefore, the requesting state
cannot have an interest in the return of a child, beyond its inter-
est in protecting that child’s welfare. Thus, the child’s best inter-
est should be the primary, or even the sole, criterion in exercis-
ing discretion.
C. Real Conflicts
This section will analyze four of the contexts discussed above,
in Part II.B, where comity is used by courts in interpreting and
applying the Abduction Convention and in which there appears
to be a real conflict between the interests of the requesting and
requested states. These are (1) the application of the grave risk
exception, (2) the application of the human rights exception, (3)
the practice of requiring undertakings, and (4) the recognition of
non-return orders.
1. The Grave Risk Exception
A finding by the requested state that the grave risk exception
is established infringes the requesting state’s comity interests,
in that it effectively refuses to defer to that state’s right to adju-
dicate because of lack of confidence in its legal system. Further-
more, in order to support the establishment of the exception, the
requisite investigation of the alleged risk of harm per se involves
questioning the administration of justice in the requesting state,
which violates the concept of deference to that state, upon which
the doctrine of comity is founded.236
Some courts have realized, however, that interpreting the
grave risk exception to exclude situations where the risk of harm
stems from the inability of the requesting state to protect the
234 See supra at III.A.1
235 Id.
236 See supra at I.A.
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child, rather than a factor outside its control, such as war or fam-
ine, disregards the wording of the Convention, which does not
restrict the grave risk of harm exception in this way.237 Further-
more, some courts have recognized that it may not be realistic to
assume that the requesting state will protect the child, and that
they must therefore satisfy themselves that the child will be pro-
tected “in fact, and not just in legal theory.”238 These courts ap-
pear to have recognized that the requested state does have a sub-
stantive interest in protecting the child that may override its
comity interests.
But, these courts have not always taken this axiom to its logi-
cal conclusion. For example, in a much-cited quotation, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit stated that the “[c]oncern
with comity among nations argues for a narrow interpreta-
tion of the ‘grave risk of harm’ exception; but the safety of
children is paramount.”239 While the recognition that the
safety of children takes precedence is most welcome, this
statement contains a logical inconsistency. If the safety of
children is paramount, then the only relevant considera-
tion in determining whether the grave risk of harm excep-
tion exists is whether the return of the child threatens his
safety. Thus, there is no room to interpret the provision
narrowly on the basis of comity. Even from the requesting
state’s perspective, its interest in protecting the child
should outweigh its interest in not having its laws and de-
cisions scrutinized by the requesting state—in which case,
there will not be any conflict between the interests of the
237 Van de Sande v. Van de Sande, 431 F.3d 567, 571 (7th Cir. 2005). It is also
clear from the travaux preparatoires and the PEREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note
32, ¶¶ 25, 116, that the drafters did not envision such a limited scope for the
defense. SCHUZ, supra note 111, at 300–01.
238 Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 571. See also Danaipour v. Mclarey, 286 F.3d 1,
24–25 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that the Swedish evaluation would not satisfy
U.S. standards). See also Khan v. Fatima, 680 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The
Convention says nothing about the adequacy of the laws of the country to
which the return of the child is sought—and for good reason, for even perfectly
adequate laws do not ensure a child’s safety.”). See also Borisovs v. Kubiles,
[2013] O.N.C.J. 85 (Can. Ont. C.J.) (accepting that the mother and child could
not be adequately protected from domestic abuse in Latvia.).
239 Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 572 (cited in Norinder v. Fuentes, 657 F.3d 526,
535 (7th Cir. 2011) and Estrada v. Salas-Perez, No 12C 1016, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 139897, at *29 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012).
2014] COMITY AND CHILD ABDUCTION 77
two states. Moreover, to the extent that a real conflict ex-
ists, the requested state’s interest in protecting the child, in ac-
cordance with its own substantive policies and the objectives of
the Abduction Convention, must prevail.
2. The Human Rights Exception
The doctrine of comity is a “nearly insurmountable barrier”240
for litigants claiming that the child should not be returned be-
cause of bias, or other forms of unfairness, inherent in the for-
eign system.241 Here, there appears to be a real conflict between
the requesting state’s interest in not having the fairness of its
system reviewed, and the requested state’s interest in ensuring
the fair treatment of the parties upon their return. This conflict
is present in all cases where litigants challenge a forum non con-
veniens dismissal by claiming that the foreign legal system is
prejudiced or unfair. Those arguing that, in such a situation,
comity should not override policies of justice and fairness,242
seem to take the view that the current forum’s substantive in-
terests in justice and fighting corruption should prevail over its
own comity interests and those of the foreign forum conveniens.
In Abduction Convention cases, however, the requested state’s
reluctance to consider claims of unfairness in the foreign legal
system seems justified, where the requesting state is a newly
acceding state. This is because the Convention does not come
into force automatically between existing Contracting States
and newly acceding states.243 Rather, the accession only has ef-
fect in regards to the relations between the acceding state and
other Contracting States who positively accept that accession.244
Thus, each Contracting State has an opportunity to examine the
240 This expression is taken from Virginia. A. Fitt, Tragedy of Comity: Ques-
tioning the American Treatment of Inadequate Foreign Courts, 50 VA. J. INT’L
L. 1021, 1044 (2009).
241 See supra at II.B.2(b)
242 Fitt, supra note 240, at 1042–44 (arguing inter alia that in order to fight
corruption, the evidentiary burdern required to show the unfairness of the le-
gal system in foreign forum conveniens should be lowered).
243 Abduction Convention, supra note 17, art. 38.
244 Id. However, a Contracting State cannot exclude application of the Conven-
tion viz-a-viz a Contracting State which was a Member of the Hague Confer-
ence on Private International Law at the time of the XIVth Session. Id, art. 37;
BEAUMONT&MCELEAVY, supra note 106, at 174.
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standards of justice in the new Contracting State before confirm-
ing the accession.245 Accordingly, acceptance of a state’s acces-
sion to the Abduction Convention is effectively an “implied ac-
ceptance of the social and legal regime prevailing in that state
at that time.”246
Yet, the fact that most Contracting States have accepted most
accessions247might suggest that states do not exercise great cau-
tion before accepting accessions. It may also suggest that states
are concerned about the political and diplomatic ramifications of
refusing to accept an accession.248 Alternatively, states may be-
lieve that the advantages of accepting an accession outweigh
concerns about the legal system of the foreign country.249 Thus,
245 PEREZ-VERAREPORT, supra note 32, ¶ 41(explaining that the choice of a sys-
tem based on express acceptance of accessions “sought to maintain the requi-
site balance between a desire for universality and the belief that a system
based on cooperation could work only if there existed amongst the Contracting
Parties a sufficient degree of mutual confidence.”). See e.g., Sourtaga v. Lee,
720 F.3d 96, 108 (2d. Cir. 2013) (referring to U.S. State Department’s approval
of Singapore when rejecting a claim that the Sharia courts in Singapore vio-
lated human rights).
246 BEAUMONT&MCELEAVY, supra note 106, at 174. Compare with cases under
§ 105 of the UCCJEA, under which U.S. courts are expected to recognize cus-
tody determinations of all foreign countries that comply with the jurisdictional
standards in the Act, provided that the custody law of the foreign country does
not violate fundamental principles of human rights. Blair, supra note 42, at
565. Courts should, perhaps, be more willing to invoke this exception in cases
where there was no prior opportunity to vet the foreign legal system.
247 See Acceptance of Accessions Table, http://www.hcch.net/upload/abduc-
toverview_e.pdf (last visited February 2nd, 2015). Nevertheless, there are a
few acceding states whose accessions have not been accepted by a substantial
number of other Contracting States. E.g., South Africa (Convention not in force
with forty-five states), Ukraine (Convention not in force with twenty-seven
states), and Zimbabwe (Convention not in force with fifty-four states). Id.
Where other states acceded after these states, the latter may have refused the
accession of the newly acceding states.
248 BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 106, at 174; Carol Bruch, Religious
Law, Secular Practices and Children’s Human Rights in Child Abduction
Cases Under the Hague Child Abduction Convention, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L&POL.
49 (2000).
249 For example, Israel hurried to accept Russia’s accession to the Abduction
Convention in 2011, apparently because a number of children have been ab-
ducted from Israel to Russia, and in the past it has not been possible to secure
the return of these children. This consideration seems to have outweighed con-
cerns expressed in Israeli legal circles about corruption in the Russian legal
system and the evidence that Russian courts favor local nationals. See Personal
communication to the author by a leading Israeli lawyer. For general concerns
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it is unclear whether acceptance of the accession of a state is a
guarantee of the standards of justice in the acceding state.
Therefore, it is necessary to weigh the comity interests of both
states against the substantive interest of each forum in protect-
ing the child, as well as the abducting parent, from an unfair
judicial system. On the one hand, it is not reasonable to require
the requesting state to meet the requested state’s standards of
justice,250 and care must be taken not to use Article 20 “as a ve-
hicle for . . . passing judgment on the political system of the coun-
try from which the child was removed.”251On the other hand, the
requested state must be prepared to invoke the Article 20 hu-
man rights exception in cases of manifest procedural or substan-
tive injustice.252
For example, an Australian court refused to order the return
of a child to the United States because the mother was unable to
obtain a visa to enter the United States.253 While the decision
was based on the Article 13(1)(b) “grave risk of harm” exception,
the court commented that the Article 20 human rights exception,
which had not been pleaded, would also have succeeded, because
the custody of the child could not be fairly determined where the
mother was denied the right to appear.254
about the Russian legal system, see Fitt, supra note 240, at 1035. For doubts
about the likelihood of proper compliance with the Abduction Convention by
Russia, see No More Child Abduction, RUSSIAN LAW ONLINE, http://www.rus-
sianlawonline.com/content/children-abduction-no-more (last visited Oct. 1,
2014). More than three years after Russia’s accession to the Convention, in
October, 2011, only thirty six states had accepted the accession. SeeAcceptance
of Accessions Table, supra note 247. It is not possible to know whether this
reflects states’ decisions not to accept the accession, or simply the slow the
speed of these decisions in some states.
250 For a similar approach under theModel Law, see In reMetcalfe &Mansfield
Alternative Invs., 421 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). Cf. Fitt, supra note
240, at 1041 (suggesting that this approach reflects fear of a “a global percep-
tion of U.S. moral imperialism.”).
251 Hague International Child Abduction Convention 51 Fed. Reg. 10510–11
(1986).
252 For a discussion of the implications of the different cultural norms of the
requesting state, see generally Rhona Schuz, The Relevance of Religious Law
and Cultural Considerations in International Child Abduction Disputes, 12 J.
L. & FAM. STUD. 453 (2010).
253 State Central Authority of Victoria v. Ardito, (Unreported, Family Court of
Melbourne, 29 Oct. 1977) (Austl.).
254 State Central Authority of Victoria v. Ardito, (Unreported, Family Court of
Melbourne, 29 Oct. 1977) (Austl.). Cf. Swiss decisions arrêt du TC VD du
17.11.2010, 214, consid 3c, discussed in AC Alfieri, ‘Enlèvement international
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Yet, even where the human rights exception has been pleaded,
reliance on the grave risk exception is preferable.255 Invoking
the human rights exception discredits the foreign legal system
ipso facto and, thus, seriously harms the requesting state’s in-
terest in not having its legal system evaluated. In contrast, the
grave risk exception focuses on the harm to the specific child.
Even though the risk of such harm may reflect on the inade-
quacy of the legal system in the requesting state, this reflection
is limited to its inability to protect the particular child and is,
thus, a lesser infringement of the comity interests of the request-
ing state. The interest of the requested state is to protect the
child; this interest is equally realized whichever exception is
used as the basis for refusing return.256
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a violation of a child’s human
rights that is serious enough to warrant invoking Article 20, but
does not also come within the grave risk exception. Take, for ex-
ample, the case of Walker v. Kitt,257 where the parties belonged
to the Black Israelite community in Dimona, Israel. The mother,
who had abducted her daughter to the United States, claimed
that the return of the child would constitute a breach of the
child’s human rights within the Article 20 exception, because the
Black Israelite community practices polygamy and treats
women as subservient to men.258 The U.S. District Court, com-
menting that there was no U.S. decision in which return had
been refused on the basis of Article 20, refused to “pass judgment
d’enfants: premières expériences avec la LF-EEA’, La pratique du droit de la
famille ch–2012–550, 555–56. Here, the children were returned to the United
States, despite the fact that the mother could not obtain a visa. Id. The court
found that the Article 13(1)(b) grave risk exception was not established and
the Article 20 human rights exception was not pleaded. Id.
255 There is no equivalent exception under the UCCJEA, and the violation of
fundamental principles must be interpreted more widely in that context. See
Blair, supra note 42, at 578–80.
256 But, where the Brussels II Regulation applies, a court may, in fact, prefer
to rely on Article 20, so as to avoid triggering the procedure in Articles 11(6)
and 11 (7) of the Regulation, under which the requesting state may “trump”
the non-return order, after considering the merits of the case. See K.
TRIMMINGS, CHILDABDUCTIONWITHIN THEEUROPEANUNION 110–19 (Hart Pub-
lishing, 2012) (suggesting that this might have been why Article 20, rather
than Article 13(1)(b), was used to refuse return in the Irish case of Foyle Health
and Social Services Trust v. EC and Anor, [2006] IEHC 448).
257 Walker v. Kitt, 900 F. Supp. 2d 849 (N.D. Ill., 2012).
258 It was claimed that, while polygamy is illegal in Israel, the authorities did
not enforce the law. Id.
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on the culture and political system” of the requesting state.259
While accepting that “cultural gender inequality was a serious
issue,” the court stated that invoking the Article 20 defense, “for
anything less than gross violations of human rights[,] would se-
riously cripple the purpose and effectivity of the Convention.”260
Of course, this statement begs the question as to what qualifies
as a gross violation of human rights. In this particular case, it is
difficult to fault the decision because the alleged breach of the
child’s human rights relates to the future and is not caused di-
rectly by the return itself. Additionally, no evidence was brought
to show that the mother could not raise her concerns in Israeli
domestic custody proceedings. 261 Moreover, the mother could
even seek permission from the Israeli courts to relocate to the
United States.
There may also be cases in which the abducting parent’s, ra-
ther than the child’s, human rights would be violated upon re-
turn. For example, the requesting state’s judicial system might
discriminate against the returned abducting parent on the basis
of gender.262 Where this discrimination creates a grave risk of
harm to the child, then the grave risk exception can be invoked.
Thus, in the case of Sourtaga v. Lee, the U.S. court understand-
ably refused to accept the abducting mother’s claim that adjudi-
cation in Singaporean Sharia courts per se violated human
rights.263 But, had there been evidence that, under the law ap-
plied in those courts, custody would be awarded automatically
to the father, without taking into account the potential harm to
the child of taking him away from the mother, it would have
been appropriate to consider the grave risk exception.
Nonetheless, the issue still arises as to whether discrimination
against women in the foreign court will lead to establishment of
the Article 20 human rights exception, in cases where harm to
the child cannot be shown.264 In such a case, the requested
state’s substantive interest in ensuring equality for women,
259 Id. at 864.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 862.
262 E.g. in legal systems which apply Sharia law, the father is usually given
legal guardianship and physical custody of older children, see Urfan Khaliq &
James Young, Cultural Diversity, Human Rights and Inconsistency in the Eng-
lish Courts, 21 LEGAL STUD. 192, 217–19 (2001).
263 Sourtaga v. Lee, 720 F.3d 96, 108 (2d Cir. 2013).
264,A paternal preference principle per se is insufficient to establish the grave
risk exception. See Schuz, supra note 252, at 480–81.
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which is an international norm, is inconsistent with its comity
interests. There may also be countervailing substantive inter-
ests. For example, the child’s right to contact with the left-be-
hind father and the child’s right to return to his natural environ-
ment265 are both protected by the Abduction Convention as well
as by the Children’s Rights Convention. Thus, the conflicting in-
terests must be carefully weighed in the light of the particular
facts of each case.
3. Undertakings
The practice of requiring undertakings, or imposing conditions
that relate to matters following return to the requesting state,266
is a clear interference with the sovereignty of the requesting
state over those within its jurisdiction. Moreover, the very impo-
sition of these undertakings expresses lack of confidence in the
requesting state’s legal system. A fortiori, steps, such as mirror
orders, designed to ensure enforceability in the requesting state,
expressly purport to “tie the hands” of the requesting state. Thus
undertakings have been described as “smack[ing] of coercion of
the foreign court.”267
But, there is another way of looking at these practices. In par-
ticular, Richard Posner has noted that “[t]here is a difference
between the law on the books and the law as it is actually ap-
plied, and nowhere is the difference as great as in domestic rela-
tions.”268 Accordingly, awareness that “even the most robust and
well-resourced legal systems suffer from enforcement gaps is not
to denigrate mutual trust and comity; it is simply to embrace
reality.”269 Thus, the requesting state should not see protective
measures as interference, but as enhancing the requesting
state’s ability to protect returning children.270
265 Id.
266 For an explanation of this practice, see supra at II.B.3(a).
267 Danaipour v. Mclarey, 286 F.3d 1, 23 (1st Cir. 2002).
268 Van De Sande v. Van De Sande, 431 F.3d 567, 570–71 (7th Cir. 2005).
269 Noah Browne, Relevance And Fairness: Protecting The Rights Of Domestic-
Violence Victims and Left-Behind Fathers Under The Hague Convention On
International Child Abduction, 60 DUKE L. J. 1193, 1212 (2011).
270 See Re O (Child Abduction: Undertakings), [1994] 2 FLR 349, 372 (Eng.)
(explaining the approach of the requested state to undertakings as follows:
“comity would be strengthened and an understanding achieved that neither
country wishes to cause offence to the court of the other, nor to seek to interfere
with or to influence what that court does.”).
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Moreover, where the court of the requested state holds that
return of the child will expose him to a grave risk of harm unless
certain actions are taken by the administrative or judicial au-
thorities of the requesting state, then the requested state has a
choice between two options. It can either refuse return on the
basis of the grave risk exception, or make the return conditional
on the taking of the required actions (i.e., undertakings). Thus,
the conditional option does not show lack of respect for the legal
system of the requested state, but rather a desire to return the
child to the country of habitual residence—as long as the return
does not place the child at risk.
Similarly, the argument that mirror orders violate comity can
be refuted. The utmost duty of the court in the requested state
is to protect the returning child. In some circumstances, the only
way the requested state’s court can protect the child’s safety is
by dictating the conditions of return—and ensuring that those
conditions are enforceable in the requesting state. Thus, the
practice of making mirror orders may actually be seen as en-
hancing comity, because it enables the child to be returned in
accordance with the law of the requesting state. Moreover, there
is no real coercion because, if the requesting state finds that the
conditions are a breach of its own sovereignty, or for some other
reason are not appropriate, it can refuse to make the mirror or-
der, and the child will remain in the requested state.
It is true that the requesting state has an interest in being free
of interference from a foreign court order that makes return con-
ditional on actions of the requesting state. This sovereign inter-
est, however, is overridden by the interest of the requested state
in ensuring that the measures which it considers necessary to
protect the returning child will indeed be taken. This follows
from the ruling in Van de Sande v. Van de Sande271 that the
safety of the child overrides considerations of comity.272 Thus, in
the light of the evidence that there is a problem in enforcing un-
dertakings,273 comity is not a valid excuse for failure to check up
on the situation in relation to the child’s safety in the requesting
state, or for refusing to take steps to ensure the enforceability of
necessary undertakings.
271 Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 572.
272 See also Klentzoris v. Klentzoris, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 533, [19] (where pref-
erence was given to the protection of children over “regard for the Greek judi-
cial authorities.”).
273 See supra at II.B.3
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4. The Recognition of Non-Return Orders
Where the requesting state has to decide whether to recognize
the non-return order of another Contracting State, there is a real
conflict of interests. On the one hand, the requesting state—now
the forum—seems to have a strong interest in protecting the
child and the left-behind parent274 from the requested state’s
failure to order the child’s return, in possible contravention of
the Convention. This substantive interest might well prevail
over its comity interests in recognizing the judicial decision of
the requested state.275 On the other hand, the requested state
has a strong interest in not having the merits of its decision re-
viewed by a foreign court. Such review effectively sets the for-
eign court up as an appellate court over the courts of the re-
quested state.
The U.S. decisions referred to above,276 when considering the
scope of the doctrine of comity in relation to the recognition of
foreign non-return orders, prefer the interest of the current fo-
rum (i.e., the original requesting state). While admitting that
the starting point should be an “inclination to accord defer-
ence”277 to the foreign non-return order, they caution that U.S.
courts are not obliged to recognize foreign decisions,278 but ra-
ther choose to do so.279Moreover, these courts state that the gen-
eral rule, that the doctrine of comity precludes review of the mer-
its of the foreign court decision,280 is not applicable in the context
of the Abduction Convention.281 The cases give two reasons for
this departure from a fundamental aspect of the doctrine of com-
ity.
274 Although in the case of Ben-Haim, No. FD 02-906-11 (NJ Super Ct Aug 25,
2011), the father had not yet acquired formal status in the United States. See
RFamA 741/11 OB-H v. ShB-H, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/ver-
dictssearch/HebrewVerdictsSearch.aspx (17/05/11).
275 Unless return is likely to contravene some other substantive interest of the
requesting state, such as the policy of combating domestic violence.
276 At Part III.B.V
277 Diorinou v. Mezitis, 237 F.3d 133, 145 (2d Cir. 2001).
278 The full faith and credit provision in Section 4 of ICARA has been inter-
preted as applying only between states within the United States. Id. at 142.
279 Asvesta v. Petroustas, 580 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2009); Diorniou, 237 F.3d at
140.
280 Stated in Hilton v. Guyot 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
281 Avesta, 580 F.3d 1001; Diorniou, 237 F.3d 133. In Diorniou, reliance was
placed on the “other special reasons” exception mentioned in Hilton, 159 U.S.
at 202.
2014] COMITY AND CHILD ABDUCTION 85
First, since the Abduction Convention is applicable equally in
all Contracting States, a U.S. court is per se in a position to re-
view the merits of the foreign decision.282 This is in contrast to
the usual situation, in which the fact that the foreign court ap-
plies foreign law, with which the local court is not familiar,
makes review of the foreign decision very difficult. Second, the
success of the Convention “relies upon the faithful application of
its provisions by American courts and the courts of other con-
tracting nations.”283 Accordingly, deference should not be ex-
tended to a foreign non-return order which “clearly misinter-
prets the Hague Convention, contravenes the Convention’s fun-
damental premises or objectives, or fails to meet a minimum
standard of reasonableness.”284
These arguments, however, are unconvincing for the following
four reasons. First, the principle of accepting a foreign decision
is not based purely on the practical difficulties involved, but on
the forum’s comity interest in respecting foreign states and their
legal systems. Thus, the forum court’s familiarity with the ap-
plicable, substantive law in Abduction Convention cases cannot
per se justify review on the merits. Moreover, procedural differ-
ences between states and the need to rely on translations pre-
sent practical impediments to the fairness of a de novo review of
the foreign case.
Second, “policing” the way in which other Member States ap-
ply the Convention is, inherently, a breach of the comity inter-
ests of both states. Furthermore, as stated in Asvesta, “careful
examination of the merits of another contracting nation’s Hague
adjudication could, in some circumstances, undermine the mu-
tual trust necessary for the Convention’s continued success.”285
Indeed, the judgment rendering state’s status as a treaty part-
ner is a reason for giving its decisions a heightened degree of
respect, whereas the approach in the U.S. case law expressly
leads to the opposite result of according such decisions less re-
spect than other foreign decisions.
Third, this approach affords no consideration to the policy of
finality of judicial decisions, upon which the principle of res ju-
dicata is based. This policy is one of the primary justifications
for the recognition of foreign judgments, over and above comity
282 See Asvesta, 580 F.3d at 1013.
283 Id. at 1014.
284 Id.
285 Id.
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considerations.286 Refusal to extend deference to the non-return
order effectively allows the left-behind parent an additional bite
of the apple, and encourages the left-behind parent to counter-
abduct, in the hope that the requesting state will review themer-
its of the non-return order. This possibility undermines the Ab-
duction Convention’s objective of deterring abductions.
Fourth, the U.S. courts ignore the impact of the refusal to ex-
tend comity to the foreign non-return order on the specific child,
whose interests the Abduction Convention is expressly designed
to protect. If the child is re-abducted after having become settled
in the state of refuge (i.e., the original requested state), the re-
abduction harms him, and thus the policy of the Abduction Con-
vention requires his return to that state, even if the non-return
order was misconceived.287 But, one might argue, if the child re-
mains in the requested state with the abductor, then the re-
questing state’s refusal to recognize the non-return order does
not affect him. This argument is flawed because a refusal of
recognition means that neither the child nor the abductor will
be able to leave that country for fear of arrest and forced return
to the requesting state.288 Thus, the child is denied his right to
visit the left-behind parent289 in the requesting state.290
286 A.T. VonMehren and D.T. Trautman,Recognition of Foreign Adjudications:
A Survey and A Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1603–04 (1968).
287 See discussion of the objectives of the Convention supra at II.A.
288 In the Israeli case of FamA 5253/00 R v. L, (unreported, 21.1.2001), the fact
that the California court would not recognize the Israeli court’s refusal to re-
turn the child—on the basis of the real risk that he would commit suicide—
meant that the mother and child had to stay in Israel until the child reached
eighteen, which effectively prevented the mother from finding employment and
prevented the boy from participating in educational trips abroad. (Personal
communication between author and the mother).
289 Cf. Re KL (a child) [2013] UKSC 75 [2014] 1 FLR 772. One consideration for
ordering return of the child under the inherent jurisdiction, despite the fact
that the Hague Convention did not apply (because the child was habitually
resident in England and not the United States at the time of the relevant U.S.
decision ordering return), was that the mother would not let the child visit his
father in the United States, since, inevitably, he would remain there, and this
lack of contact with the father would be harmful to the child. Id.
290 Where both states are parties to the Hague Conference on Private Interna-
tional Law’s. Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law,
Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsi-
bility and Measures for the Protection of Children, HCCH,
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=70 (last visited,
Feb. 2, 2015), the stalemate should be resolved once twelve months have
passed since the date that the left-behind parent knew the whereabouts of the
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Accordingly, in the light of these considerations, the original
requesting state, now the forum state, has strong comity inter-
ests in recognizing the foreign non-return order, without review
of the merits of that order. These comity interests may override
any interest the requesting state has in protecting the left-be-
hind parent—or promoting the objectives of the Convention.
Thus, the conflict turns out to be false, and the non-return order
will be recognized. Even to the extent that there is still a real
conflict of interests between the two states, the strong comity
interest of the requested state in not having its judgments re-
viewed together with the comity interests of the requesting
state, should prevail, except in extreme cases of fundamental
misapplication of the Convention. Carrascosa v. McGuire was
such an extreme case, both because the Spanish court deter-
mined the custody rights of the parties under its own law, and
not under the law of the habitual residence,291 and because its
approach to the mother’s right to travel would render the Abduc-
tion Convention completely redundant. However, the other cases
discussed above do not seem to come into this category.
In the Ben-Haim case,292 the New Jersey court effectively in-
terfered with the Israeli court’s finding that the father had con-
sented to or acquiesced in the abduction of his own free will.293
The Abduction Convention does not state that an unsigned
agreement cannot constitute consent. Furthermore consent and
acquiescence are determined subjectively on the basis of all the
circumstances of the case.294 Thus, while there is room to ques-
tion the correctness of the decision of the Israeli Supreme Court
on the issue of consent or acquiescence, the finding cannot be
child and the child has become settled in his or her new environment. At that
time, the country of refuge will become the child’s habitual residence (Id. art.
7) and so will have international jurisdiction to make orders relating to the
child (Id. art. 5(1)), which will be automatically entitled to recognition by all
other signatory states (Id. art. 23(1)). This Convention is currently ratified by
only forty-one states, not including the United States. See Concise Status
Charts, HCCH, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=25,
(last visited Feb. 2, 2015).),
291 Which, in the words of the court, “violates principles of international com-
ity.” Carrascosa v. McGuire, 520 F.3d 249, 263 (3d Cir. 2008).
292 See supra at II.B.4.
293 RFamA 741/11 OB-H v. ShB-H, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/ver-
dictssearch/HebrewVerdictsSearch.aspx (last visited May 17, 2011).
294 Re H and others (minors) (abduction: acquiescence) [1997] 2 All E.R. 225 at
235 (Eng.).
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said to be a fundamental misapplication of the Convention. Sim-
ilarly, the U.S. court was not in a position to choose between the
views of the different Israeli judges on the issue of free will, es-
pecially without understanding the use of ne exeat orders in
family proceedings in Israel, and the possibility of giving appro-
priate security to have such orders lifted.
The Asvesta case is more borderline than the Ben-Haim be-
cause it is less clear that the foreign decision cannot be said to
be a fundamental misapplication of the Convention. On the one
hand, the Greek decision was made on the merits, and was
“largely untethered from the relatively structured inquiry re-
quired by the Hague Convention.”295 On the other hand, the fac-
tual findings of the court, could have justified invocation of the
grave risk exception—or the exception of lack of exercise of pa-
rental rights.296 In the case of doubt, the mutual comity interests
of both states should prevail and the no-return order should be
recognized.
D. Interim Summary
The above analysis shows that the various ways in which Ab-
duction Convention cases use comity often do not reflect the real
interests of the states involved. A number of factors may explain
this phenomenon. The first such factor is the belief that the
child’s return is the primary objective of the Convention, which
leads to the automatic equation of non-return with noncompli-
ance. Accordingly, comity is called in to support interpretation
of an exception or to exercise discretion in a way that yields a
return order.297 Conversely, in a non-return case, comity is vir-
tually ignored, as surrendering to comity interests would require
acceptance of the non-return order. This approach is fundamen-
tally misguided because, as is clear from the Preamble, the true
objective of the Convention is protecting the child’s best interest,
which does not always require return.298
The second factor, which is related to the first, is the fail-
ure of some courts to understand that the exceptions themselves
are crucial to the Convention’s primary goal of protecting chil-
dren. As such, the exceptions must be interpreted in the light of
295 Asvesta v. Petroustas, 580 F.3d 1001, 1016 (9th Cir. 2009).
296 Abduction Convention, supra note 17, art. 13(1)(a).
297 See supra at II.B.2 and II.B.3.
298 Abduction Convention, supra note 17, Preamble.
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the policies which inform them together with the objectives of
the Convention and invocation of the exceptions cannot be auto-
matically equated with noncompliance.299 Accordingly, comity
cannot be employed to limit the scope of the exceptions.
The third factor, and the source of the first two, is the
failure of courts to examine the real interests of the states. Ra-
ther, many courts simply assume that comity requires return
under the Convention without an examination of the legal sys-
tem of the requesting state or any consideration of other relevant
substantive interests.
While the first factor seems specific to the Abduction
Convention, the other two failures are structural, and could eas-
ily occur in the context of other international instruments con-
taining rules and exceptions, where comity is used to inform in-
terpretation and application. In the next section, this Article will
examine the extent to which similar problems can be found in
cases under the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.300 As
background to the examination of these cases and a comparison
with the use of comity in Abduction Convention cases, this sec-
tion will begin with an explanation of the mechanism and objec-
tives of the Model Law, and highlight some of the similarities
and differences between these and those of the Abduction Con-
vention.
IV. THEUNCITRALMODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER
INSOLVENCY
A. Mechanism and Objectives
The Model Law301 requires courts to recognize a foreign insol-
vency proceeding in the state where the debtor has the center of
its main interests—called a “foreign main proceeding”302—at the
299 See supra at III.A.2.
300 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY (1997) [hereinafter
MODEL LAW]
301 Legislation based on the Model Law has been adopted in twenty states. Sta-
tus: UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997), UNCITRAL,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_sta-
tus.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2015).
302 MODEL LAW, supra note 300, art. 2(a); 11 U.S.C. § 1501.
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request of the foreign representative of the debtor,303 subject to
a public policy exception.304 Following recognition of foreign
main proceedings, certain relief automatically ensues.305 This
relief includes (1) a stay of actions or proceedings concerning the
debtor’s assets, rights, obligations, or liabilities; (2) a stay of ex-
ecution against the debtor’s assets; and (3) a suspension of the
right to transfer, encumber, or otherwise dispose of any assets of
the debtor.306 Additionally, the court has discretion to order fur-
ther relief, such as entrusting the foreign representative with
distribution of the debtor’s assets situated within the jurisdic-
tion of the court.307 The objectives of the Model Law are set out
in the Preamble as follows:
The purpose of this Law is to provide effective mechanisms for
dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency so as to promote
the objectives of:
(a) Cooperation between the courts and other competent au-
thorities of this State and foreign States involved in cases of
cross-border insolvency;
(b) Greater legal certainty for trade and investment;
(c) Fair and efficient administration of cross-border insolven-
cies that protects the interests of all creditors and other inter-
ested persons, including the debtor;
(d) Protection and maximization of the value of the debtor’s as-
sets; and
(e) Facilitation of the rescue of financially troubled businesses,
thereby protecting investment and preserving employment.308
303 Id. art. 16. Art. 2(d) defines a foreign representative as "a person or body,
including one appointed on an interim basis, authorized in a foreign proceed-
ing to administer the reorganization or the liquidation of the debtor’s assets
or affairs or to act as a representative of the foreign proceeding."
304 Id. art. 6 (“Nothing in this Law prevents the court from refusing to take an
action governed by this Law if the action would be manifestly contrary to the
public policy of this State.”) (enacted in the United States as § 1506).
305 Id. art. 20.
306 Id. art. 20(1).
307 Id. art. 21(2).
308 Id. at Preamble.
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The approach taken by the Model Law can be classified as a
modified universal approach.309 On the one hand, it requires
states to recognize the proceedings in the main state. On the
other hand, it respects differences between legal regimes, and
leaves some leeway for each state to protect local interests. This
synthesis is achieved by the provision of a procedural frame-
work310 for cooperation between jurisdictions that leaves sub-
stantive law largely in place.311
B. Comparisons with the Abduction Convention
A central objective of both the Abduction Convention and the
Model Law is to avoid conflicting proceedings located in different
states.312 Additionally, both instruments ensure that substan-
tive issues are decided by the courts of the most appropriate and
most interested state.313 In pursuance of these objectives, the fo-
rum state is, normally, obliged to stay its own substantive pro-
ceedings.314Both instruments allow exceptions to the basic man-
datory rules, but the respective official guides to interpretation
309 J. Leong, Is Chapter 15 Universalist or Territorialist? Empirical Evidence
from United States Bankruptcy Court Cases, 29 WIS. INT’L L.J. 110, 112–13
(2011).
310 The details of this procedural framework are outside the scope of this Arti-
cle. For a detailed discussion of the Model Law, see IANFLETCHER, INSOLVENCY
IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW Chapter 8 (Oxford University Press, 2d ed.
2005).
311 UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, GUIDE TO
ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION OF THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-
BORDER INSOLVENCYWITHGUIDE TOENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION ¶ 3 (2014)
[hereinafter GUIDE TO ENACTMENT], available at http://www.un-
citral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/1997-Model-Law-Insol-2013-Guide-Enact-
ment-e.pdf.
312 While the Model Law does anticipate that there may be a need for proceed-
ings in the states where the assets are situated, its provisions are designed to
ensure that these concurrent proceedings supplement the main proceedings,
rather than conflict with them. Id. paras. 42–45.
313 In the case of the Abduction Convention, the court of the child’s habitual
residence, and, in the case of the Model Law, the debtor’s center of main inter-
ests.
314 Upon the making of an application for return under the Abduction Conven-
tion, the courts of the requested state are obliged to stay any custody proceed-
ings. Abduction Convention, supra note 17, art. 16. Under theModel Law, upon
recognition of a foreign main proceeding, other proceedings are stayed, subject
to certain exceptions. MODEL LAW, supra note 300, art. 20(2).
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make clear that the exceptions should be interpreted nar-
rowly.315 Likewise, both instruments provide for discretionary
relief in certain circumstances, either in addition to mandatory
relief,316 or where mandatory relief is not allowed.317 On a pro-
cedural level, under both instruments, each state may both re-
ceive inward-bound requests (i.e., to return a child or recognize
foreign main insolvency proceedings) and send outward-bound
requests (i.e., asking for return of a child or for recognition of its
main insolvency proceedings).318 In addition, both expressly re-
quire cooperation between relevant bodies in each state.319
Interestingly, some of the practices provided for by the Model
Law, although not mentioned in the Abduction Convention, have
been developed by courts in Abduction Convention cases. For ex-
ample, the Model Law specifically provides for direct judicial
communication,320 a practice which has been adopted by some
judges in Abduction Convention cases and promoted via the
Hague judicial network.321 Similarly, the broad discretion given
to courts by the Model Law to condition relief as it feels appro-
priate,322 inter alia in order to protect creditors,323 is similar to
the practice of requiring undertakings to protect the child and
returning abductor, adopted by some courts in Abduction Con-
vention proceedings.324
Finally, while both instruments may appear to be largely pro-
cedural, venue-determining mechanisms, in fact they have sub-
stantive and far-reaching consequences. Thus, under the Model
315 GUIDE TOENACTMENT, supra note 311, ¶¶ 30, 104, 161; PEREZ-VERAREPORT,
supra note 32, ¶ 34.
316 SeeMODEL LAW, supra note 300, art. 21.
317 Under the Abduction Convention where there has been a wrongful removal
or retention, but one of the exceptions has been established, the court has dis-
cretion to order return.
318 In relation to the Model Law, see GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 311, ¶
53.
319 Under the Abduction Convention, the Central Authorities are required “to
cooperate with each other and promote cooperation among competent authori-
ties in their respective states.” Abduction Convention, supra note 17, art. 7.
Similarly under the Model Law, courts and trustees, or other insolvency offic-
ers, are required “to cooperate to the maximum extent possible with foreign
courts or foreign representatives.” MODEL LAW, supra note 300, arts. 25, 26.
320 MODEL LAW, supra note 300, art. 25.
321 See sources cited supra note 152.
322 MODEL LAW, supra note 300, art. 22(2); Leong, supra note 309, at 117.
323 GUIDE TOENACTMENT, supra note 311, ¶ 187.
324 See supra Part III.B.4.
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Law, granting a type of relief that would not be available in the
forum will invariably affect the financial position of creditors325
and, under the Abduction Convention, the child’s return has an
immediate impact on the life of that child and may affect the
outcome of the substantive proceedings.
However, despite these remarkable similarities, there are very
important differences, three of which should be borne in mind
when comparing the use of comity under the two regimes. First,
the Model Law is adopted by states unilaterally, and, in its ap-
plication, does not distinguish between foreign states that have
also enacted the Law and those that have not.326 In contrast, the
Abduction Convention involves reciprocal obligations, which
might increase the need for comity.327
Second, the Model Law involves more complex situations,
which juggle many interested parties from different states and
which cover a wide variety of relief. This complexity makes it
harder to identify conflicting interests—and to balance between
them. Ironically, the simplicity of the Abduction Conventionmay
be a reason that courts have failed to identify the relevant state
interests.328
Third, the most obvious difference is that the Abduction Con-
vention concerns the interests and welfare of children. In con-
trast, the Model Law deals with purely financial interests. This
fundamental difference must affect the interests of states under
each regime, and the way in which competing interests are
weighed against one another. Nonetheless, there is sufficient
common ground between the two instruments to justify a com-
parison of the uses of comity, both in interpretation and applica-
tion of their provisions and in the exercise of discretion under
each regime.
325 Leong, supra note 309, at 114.
326 For implications of the unilateral adoption model, see FLETCHER, supra note
310, at 445–46.
327 C.f. claims that the ultimate success of the Model Law, however, depends
on the “power of example.” Id; see also Leong, supra note 309, at 136 (suggest-
ing that a lack of correct compliance with the Model Law by the United States
may discourage other states from complying with, or even adopting, it).
328 See detailed discussion of interests and judicial misconceptions in relation
to them, supra Part III.A
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C. The Model Law and Comity in the United States
In 2005, the United States enacted the Model Law, with rela-
tively minor changes, as Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.329
This section briefly examines the treatment of comity in judicial
decisions that apply the provisions of Chapter 15. Prior to the
enactment of the Model Law, comity played a pivotal role in
cross-border insolvency cases,330 but the inherent uncertainty of
the doctrine331 led to inconsistent results. Indeed, the Model Law
was expressly designed to reduce the uncertainty caused by
overreliance on comity.332 Part of this design is the Model Law’s
obligation to recognize foreign insolvency proceedings where the
criteria therein are met,333 subject to the public policy exception.
While the Model Law mandates recognition of qualifying for-
eign proceedings, post-recognition relief is largely discretionary.
Significantly, § 1507(b) of the Bankruptcy Code expressly pro-
vides that, in exercising this discretion, courts should check con-
sistency with the principles of comity, even though there is no
parallel provision in the Model Law.334 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit
329 11 U.S.C § 1501 (replacing previous provisions relating to cross-border in-
solvency).
330 In re Iida, 377 B.R. 243, 253 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007) (“At least since the Nine-
teenth Century, principles of ‘comity’ or accommodation of foreign proceedings
have provided the method by which foreign bankruptcies have been recognized
in American jurisprudence.”); (enforcing under “international comity” Cana-
dian bankruptcy scheme of arrangement made under Canadian statute that
would have been unconstitutional impairment of contract if enacted by United
States.”) (citing Canada S. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 539 (1883) and
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THECONFLICT OFLAWS §§ 420–21 (1846); Cu-
nard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs. AB, 773 F.2d 452, 457–60 (2d Cir. 1985)
(“Thus, it is long settled that when there is a case or controversy regarding a
foreign bankruptcy or a representative of a foreign bankruptcy that warrants
the intervention of courts in the United States, comity provides a basic mode
of analysis.”).
331 Which typically involved weighing up various comity factors. See e.g. In Re
French, 440 F.3d 145, 153 (2006).
332 GUIDE TOENACTMENT, supra note 311, ¶ 5 (“the absence of predictability in
the handling of cross-border insolvency cases can impede capital flow and be a
disincentive to cross-border investment.”).
333 In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund,
Ltd., 389 B.R. 325, 332–34 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that principles of
comity are not relevant in determining where the debtor’s center of main in-
terests is situated).
334Nor was such a provision included in the U.K. Cross-Border Insolvency Reg-
ulations, supra note 18. This absence may explain why no reference is made to
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stated that “[i]n revising Chapter 15’s predecessor, § 304, Con-
gress elevated comity from a factor under § 304(c) to the intro-
ductory text of § 1507 ‘to make it clear that it is the central con-
cept to be addressed.’”335 Nonetheless, this same provision also
requires the court to take into account factors that clearly reflect
U.S. substantive interests and policies—such as ensuring “dis-
tribution of the proceeds of the debtor’s property substantially
in accordance with the order prescribed by this title,”336 and the
need to provide adequate protection of the creditors.337 Accord-
ingly, tensions between comity and other interests protected by
the forum are likely to be played out in relation to both the ques-
tion of whether discretionary relief should be awarded338 and the
application of the public policy exception. The following exam-
ples illustrate the courts’ approach to comity in these two con-
texts.
In Metcalfe, the court ordered the recognition of orders
made in the main Canadian proceedings, even though they in-
cluded third-party, non-debtor release and injunction provisions,
which could not have been issued by a U.S. court in domestic
bankruptcy proceedings.339 In determining that principles of
comity supported recognition of the Canadian orders, the U.S.
court placed considerable weight on Canada’s status as a sister
common law state, and on the fact that no doubt had been cast
on the procedural fairness of the Canadian proceedings.340 In ad-
dition, the court noticed that the plan, which the Canadian order
established, had been adopted with near unanimous creditor
support and that there was no basis to question the decisions of
comity by the U.K. Supreme Court in the case of Rubin and another v. Eu-
rofinance SA and others, [2012] UKSC 46, when holding that recognition of
foreign judgments against third parties is not within the discretionary relief
allowed by the Insolvency Regulations. In contrast, Lord Clarke, in his dissent,
does rely on comity interests, such as international cooperation and global com-
merce. Id. ¶¶ 199, 204.
335 In re Vitro, 701 F.3d 1031, 1064 (2013).
336 11 U.S.C. § 1507(b)(4).
337 Id. § 1522(a) (limiting the discretion to grant relief under § 1521).
338 Leong, supra note 309, at 125 (showing that, while the vast majority of cases
recognized foreign proceedings, only in 9.1 percent of the cases in which there
were U.S. creditors did they exercise their discretion to order entrustment of
assets for distribution without any qualifications).
339 In reMetcalfe &Mansfield Alternative Invs., 421 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2010).
340 Id. at 698–99.
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the Canadian courts.341 Indeed, the record does not reveal any
competing domestic interests. The court emphasized that proce-
dural and substantive differences between U.S. law and foreign
law are insufficient to invoke the public policy exception.342
The cases where relief available under the Model Law was re-
fused, either on the basis that it was inappropriate to grant dis-
cretionary relief, or on the basis of the public policy exception,
are more instructive for the purposes of this Article’s analysis,
because courts in these cases tend to explain the interests that
override comity.
In Toft,343 the U.S. bankruptcy court refused to grant recogni-
tion to an ex parte German Mail Interception Order against the
German debtor’s email addresses, with servers in the United
States. The court refused recognition, even though such an order
was available under German law.344 The ground for the court's
refusal was that such an order, which was banned by U.S. law,345
might subject those who enforced it to criminal prosecution.346
Additionally, the order would violate the rights of privacy that
also protected non-U.S. citizens.347
In Gold and Honey,348 the U.S. bankruptcy court held that rec-
ognizing the Israeli Receivership proceedings, which had been
started in violation of a stay awarded by the U.S. court, would
be manifestly contrary to U.S. public policy. Condoning this be-
havior of the receivers “would limit a federal court’s jurisdiction
over all of the debtors’ property . . . as any future creditor could
follow the lead of the receivers and violate the stay in order to
procure assets that were outside the United States, yet still un-
der the U.S. court’s jurisdiction.”349 Thus, the fundamental U.S.
341 Id. at 700.
342 Id. at 697; see also RSM Richter Inc. v. Aguilar (In re Ephedra Prods. Lia-
bility Litig), 349 B.R. 333, 336 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). This approach to proce-
dural and substantive differences between the two laws mirrors that taken in
relation to the Article 20 human rights exception in the Abduction Convention.
See e.g., Caro v. Sher, 687 A.2d 354 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996).
343 In re Dr. Toft, Debtor in a Foreign Proceeding, 453 B.R. 186 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2011).
344 Id. at 198.
345 Id. at 196.
346 Id.
347 Id. at 198.
348 In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., Debtor in a Foreign Proceeding, 410 B.R. 357
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009).
349 Id. at 372.
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interest protected by the court was the deterrence of future vio-
lations of its orders.
In Qimonda,350 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit upheld the bankruptcy court’s refusal to allow the Ger-
man representative to revoke patent licenses in accordance with
German law.351 The German representative’s claim that comity
required granting him relief was rejected because § 1522(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code conditioned the granting of relief on ensur-
ing adequate protection for the creditors and other interested
entities.352 In this instance, the Fourth Circuit held that the U.S.
creditors’ patent licensees would not be sufficiently protected.353
In determining that § 1522(a) requires a balancing of the sub-
stantive interests of the various parties,354 regardless of whether
this balance leads to tension with the foreign law,355 the court
relied heavily on the Guide to Enactment of the Model Law
(“Guide to Enactment”).356 The Guide to Enactment states that
achieving a balance between the relief that may be granted to
the foreign representative and the interests of the persons that
may be affected by such relief “is essential to achieve the objec-
tives of cross-border insolvency legislation.”357 In other words,
the Model Law recognizes that the need to achieve such a bal-
ance of private interests may prevail over comity.
The bankruptcy court in Qimonda also held that “deferring to
German law, to the extent [that] it allows cancellation of the U.S.
patent licenses, would be manifestly contrary to U.S. public pol-
icy.”358 The reason for this holding was that failure to apply §
365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code, which allowed the licensees to
350 Jaffee v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., 737 F.3d 14 (4th Cir. 2013).
351 The German proceedings had been recognized as main proceedings under
Chapter 15. Id. at 18.
352 Id. at 32.
353 Id.
354 The foreign representative claimed that § 1522(a) is merely a procedural
protection ‘“designed to ensure that all creditors [could] participate in the
bankruptcy distribution on an equal footing’ and thus it should not be used to
protect parties from the substantive bankruptcy law that would otherwise ap-
ply in the foreign main proceeding.” Id. at 27.
355 As claimed by the foreign representative. Id.
356 GUIDE TOENACTMENT, supra note 311.
357 Id. ¶ 161. Elsewhere, the Guide to Enactment indicates that Article 22 is
designed to “protect the interests of the creditors (in particular local creditors),
the debtor and other affected persons.” Id. ¶ 35.
358 In re Qimonda AG, 462 B.R. 165, 185 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2011).
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retain their rights under the licenses, would “severely impinge”
an important statutory protection accorded to licensees of U.S.
patents.359 Failure to apply this protection would, therefore “un-
dermine a fundamental U.S. policy promoting technological in-
novation.”360 While the Federal Circuit refused to determine the
correctness of the reliance on the public policy exception, it ex-
pressly recognized that its decision not to grant relief on the ba-
sis of § 1522(a) furthered the public policy that underlies §
365(n).361
Finally, In Re Vitro, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, while emphasizing that comity is the rule under
Chapter 15 and not the exception,362 upheld the bankruptcy
court’s refusal to allow enforcement of a Mexican reorganization
plan under § 1507 or § 1521 because the plan discharged obliga-
tions held by non-debtor guarantors and did not provide the pro-
tections afforded to creditors under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.363
Significantly, the court expressly considered whether the argu-
ments in favor of comity outweighed the court’s concerns under
§ 1507(b)(4)—namely, whether distribution is substantially the
same under the proposed plan as it would be under local law.
The court held that the factors that might have swayed it in fa-
vor of granting comity were absent.364 In the light of this conclu-
sion, the Fifth Circuit found it unnecessary to determine the cor-
rectness of the bankruptcy court’s invocation of the public policy
exception on the basis that “the protection of third party claims
in a bankruptcy case is a fundamental policy of the United
States.”365
D. Comparative Analysis of Model Law Cases and Abduction
Convention Cases
Analysis of the approach of U.S. Model Law cases to comity, in
comparison with the Abduction Convention cases considered in
Part II, above, reveals two general methodological distinctions.
From both of these distinctions, lessons can be learned that
359 Id. at 185.
360 Id.
361 Jaffee v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., 737 F.3d 14, 49 (4th Cir. 2013).
362 In re Vitro S.A.B. De C.V., 701 F.3d 1031, 1064 (5th Cir. 2012).
363 Id. at 1067.
364 Id. (giving, as examples of such factors truly exceptional circumstances that
would make the release, or the consent of the affected creditors, necessary.).
365 Id. at 1070.
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could be applied, both in Abduction Convention cases, and in the
application of other international instruments as well. The fol-
lowing subsections will address each of these lessons.
1. General and Specific Exceptions
While the only express exception in the Model Law is the pub-
lic policy exception, the limitations on the court’s discretion, for
example, in Articles 21(2)366 and 22(1),367 are in fact specific ex-
ceptions, albeit not absolute ones, to the broad power to grant
discretionary relief. A clear difference can be seen in the courts’
approach to the general public policy exception and to these spe-
cific “exceptions.” In particular, the warning that the public pol-
icy exception should be interpreted narrowly and used spar-
ingly368 is not found in relation to the specific “exceptions.” No-
tably, the Federal Circuit in Qimonda369 and the Fifth Circuit in
Re Vitro370 expressly affirmed the refusal of the bankruptcy
court to grant discretionary relief by relying on the specific “ex-
ceptions.” Neither the Federal nor the Fifth Circuit decided
whether the bankruptcy court had erred in also invoking the
public policy exception. The Fifth Circuit commented in Re Vitro
that the public policy exception in § 1506 “was intended to be
read narrowly, a fact that does not sit well with the bankruptcy
court’s broad description of the fundamental policy at stake as
‘the protection of third party claims in a bankruptcy case.’”371
366 Article 21(2) providing that a court can only entrust assets to the foreign
representative for distribution if it is satisfied that the interests of creditors in
the non-main state are adequately protected. MODEL LAW, supra note 300, art.
21(2).
367 Article 22(1) provides that, in granting relief under Article 19 or Article 21,
the court must be satisfied that the interests of the creditors and other inter-
ested persons, including the debtor, are adequately protected. More examples
can be found in § 1507(b) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Id. art. 22(1).
368 See e.g., In re Vitro S.A.B. De C.V., 701 F.3d 1031, 1069 (5th Cir. 2012); In
reDr. Toft, Debtor in a Foreign Proceeding, 453 B.R. 186, 195 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2011); In re Qimonda AG Bankruptcy Litigation, 433 B.R. 547, 570 (E.D. Va.
2010) (stating that the exception would only apply where the procedural fair-
ness of the foreign proceeding is in doubt, or cannot be cured by the adoption
of additional protections, or where taking the action requested “would frustrate
a U.S. court’s ability to administer the Chapter 15 proceeding and/or would
impinge severely a U.S. constitutional or statutory right.”).
369 Qimonda, 433 B.R. 547.
370 Vitro S.A.B. De C.V., 701 F.3d at 1070.
371 Id. at 1069–70.
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The court’s comment indicates that it doubted whether the pub-
lic policy exception had been properly invoked. This difference in
approach to the two types of exceptions is not simply a function
of the principle that a specific provision should be relied upon,
in preference to a general one. 372 Rather, the difference can be
seen as reflecting the scope of the doctrine of comity, which is
more easily overridden by specific exceptions than by general
ones.
Specific exceptions evince policies that are part of the philoso-
phy of an international instrument373 and, therefore, reflect the
mutual interests of both states, where the foreign state is also a
party to the instrument. These interests may prevail over the
comity interests of one or both states, and thereby create a false
conflict.374 Accordingly, while the scope of the specific exception
must be examined carefully in the light of its purpose, such an
examination does not necessitate a narrow interpretation. In
contrast, a general public policy exception reflects no specific pol-
icy of the international instrument. This fact makes a real con-
flict between the comity interests of the foreign state and the
substantive interests of the forum state much more likely. Due
to this increased possibility for real conflict, a narrow interpre-
tation of general exceptions is justified.
This insight into comity’s role in the interpretation of different
types of exceptions is pertinent to the Abduction Convention,
and indeed to other international instruments. The exceptions
in the Abduction Convention375 are specific and not general—
372 In re Dr. Toft, Debtor in a Foreign Proceeding, 453 B.R. at 196.
373 E.g. GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 311, ¶ 196 (stating that the policy
behind Article 22 of the Model Law is to balance the interests of those affected
by the relief).
374 See supra Part II.B. This point goes beyond the recognition that the issue of
comity is moot unless foreign law applies (as noted in Qimonda (Dist) at 568),
because it takes into account the question of the extent to which the foreign
state actually has an interest in its law applying. Thus, for example, there
could be a situation in which, in the circumstances of the case under the appli-
cable law of the foreign state, some creditors would not be protected, whereas
equal protection could be afforded under the law of the forum. In such a case,
the foreign state might not have an interest—or, at least, not a strong inter-
est—in its law applying. In re Qimonda AG Bankruptcy Litigation, 433 B.R. at
568.
375 See supra list at note 70.
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apart from the Article 20 human rights exception.376 In particu-
lar, two similarities with the specific “exceptions” in the Model
Law should be noted. First, the exceptions themselves give ex-
pression to an identifiable policy, which is part of the philosophy
of the instrument itself. Second, these exceptions are not abso-
lute, and, even where they are established, the court still has
discretion to order return.377 Accordingly, by analogy with the
approach in the Model Law cases and in line with the reasoning
above, comity should not be used as a reason to interpret the
exceptions in the Abduction Convention narrowly, other than
the Article 20 human rights exception.
2. Interest Analysis
The U.S. Model Law cases demonstrate a general awareness
of the need to find an appropriate balance between comity and
competing substantive interests. Moreover, while comity is seen
as the rule rather than the exception, courts have found that
comity can be overridden by other policies—whether those re-
flected in Chapter 15 itself378 or those stemming from other stat-
utory or constitutional provisions.379
Of particular interest in the context of the discussion in
this Article are the courts’ attempts to articulate the relevant
interests, which they must in turn balance. Thus, for example,
one court explained that the interest of the United States in
granting comity is to ensure that “the assets of a debtor are dis-
persed in an equitable, orderly, and systematic manner, rather
than in a haphazard, erratic, or piecemeal fashion.”380 The court
went on to state that U.S. courts “have consistently recognized
the interest of foreign courts in liquidating or winding up the
affairs of their own domestic business entities.”381 Similarly, the
bankruptcy court in Ernst & Young addresses the policy that
376 The human rights exception was the compromise between those delegates
who wanted a general public policy exception and those who were vehemently
opposed to it. M. Weiner, Strengthening Article 20, 38 U.S. FAM. L. REV. 701,
708–11 (2004).
377 PEREZ-VERAREPORT, supra note 32, ¶ 113.
378 See e.g., Qimonda and In re Vitro, discussed supra Part C.
379 See e.g. Re Toft, discussed supra Part C.
380 Zeeco, Inc. v. Sivec SRL., No. 10-CV-143-JHP, 2012 WL 49362 (E.D.Okla.
Jan. 1, 2012) (citing Cunard S.S. Co., Ltd v. Salen Reefer Services AB, 773 F.2d
452, 458 (2nd Cir. 1985)).
381 Id.
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“wronged investors should share in the assets accumulated in
the receivership proceeding, regardless of nationality or lo-
cale.”382 The court also mentions that both states’ real interest is
the most efficient administration of insolvency—not the protec-
tion of local creditors in preference to others.383 The opinions in
these cases express the mutual interests of both states, reflected
by the doctrine of comity.
In cases where there is a conflict between comity and the “com-
peting substantive interests” of the forum based on local statute,
courts sometimes refer to the legislative history of a particular
statutory provision in an effort to show that the provision was
intended to protect the interest in question. For example, in
Qimonda, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit notes
as follows:
“The Senate Report accompanying the bill that became § 365(n)
explicitly recognized that licensees have a strong interest in
maintaining their right to use intellectual property following
the licensor’s bankruptcy and that to deny them that right
would ‘impose[] a burden on American technological develop-
ment that was never intended by Congress.’”384
Similarly, expert evidence may be relied upon to determine
whether the granting of the relief requested would in fact result
in denial of the protection conferred by the local statute.385
Thus, it can be seen that the approach taken in these cases
does involve interest analysis methodology. In that analysis, the
courts pit the allegedly competing substantive interests of the
forum state against the mutual comity interests of both the fo-
rum and the foreign states.386 This approach is broadly con-
sistent with Story’s concept387 of comity and with the interest
382 In re Ernst & Young, Inc., 383 B.R. 773, 781 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2008).
383 Id.
384 Jaffe v. Samsung Electronics Co., 737 F.3d 14, 32 (4th Cir. 2013).
385 In re Qimonda AG, 462 B.R. 165, 185 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2011) (citing expert
testimony “that the resulting uncertainty would . . . slow the pace of innova-
tion, to the detriment of the U.S. economy”).
386 See in reDr. Toft, Debtor in a Foreign Proceeding, 453 B.R. 186, 195 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2011). The court specifically explains that, although under conflict of
law principles, German law seemed to have the primary interest in the resolu-
tion of the matter, this was not determinative because the decision related to
U.S. public policy. Id.
387 Lorenzen, supra note 6, at 33–35; Watson, supra note 22, at 20–22.
2014] COMITY AND CHILD ABDUCTION 103
analysis framework—for which this Article advocates.388 A crit-
ical analysis of the weight placed on the respective interests in
these cases is outside the scope of this Article, however. Indeed,
it may be that insufficient weight has been placed on comity in-
terests.389Nonetheless, defective implementation is not a reason
to reject the proposed framework. Rather, it is indicative of a
need for courts to identify the relevant interests more care-
fully390 and to be more aware of the wider implications of giving
preference to substantive interests.391
In contrast to the Model Law cases, the Abduction Con-
vention cases that mention comity evince a blind assumption
that comity requires the return of the child, and no examination
is undertaken of the comity, or substantive interests, of either
state. Thus, for example, while some courts have recognized that
the child’s safety overrides comity,392 they have not considered
other substantive policies that might be engaged in cases of do-
mestic violence—even where the child’s physical safety does not
seem to be in immediate jeopardy.393 Paradoxically, in relation
to foreign non-return orders, courts have paid insufficient atten-
tion to either the real comity interests of the forum or to sub-
stantive policies of the forum, such as discouraging counter-ab-
duction.394 Thus, the Model Law cases teach us that, before cit-
ing the doctrine of comity, courts should articulate the relevant
388 See supra I.B.
389 See e.g., Leong, supra note 309, at 133 (stating that courts’ refusal to exer-
cise their discretion to hand over assets to foreign representatives uncondition-
ally, in order to ensure that U.S. creditors are not prejudiced by application of
foreign priority schemes, is frustrating the objectives of the Model Law); see
also Buckel, supra note 1 (criticizing Qimonda and In Vitro). For a narrow
reading of In re Vitro, see Tonya Ramsay and John Napier, Enforcing Orders
Of Foreign Courts Under Chapter 15 of The Bankruptcy Code: In Re Vitro
S.A.B. de C.V., 63 ADVOCATE 60 (Summer 2013).
390 For example, it is doubtful that there is a strong interest in protecting local
creditors from different priority schemes—which seems to be the main motive
behind the refusal to hand over assets—unless, under those schemes, they are
going to be unfairly discriminated against. Leong, supra note 309, at 134.
391 For a discussion of these implications, see Leong, supra note 309, at 136‒
39.
392 Van De Sande v. Van De Sande, 431 F.3d 567, 572 (7th Cir. 2005).
393 See e.g., Sourtaga v. Lee, 720 F.3d 96, 10r (2d. Cir. 2013) (stating that "the
Article 13(b) inquiry is not whether repatriation would place the respondent
parent's safety at grave risk, but whether so doing would subject the child to a
grave risk of physical or psychological harm.").
394 See supra Part IV.C.4.
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comity and substantive interests of both states. By doing so, the
courts can identify false conflicts and resolve real conflicts in an
informed manner, based on weighing the competing interests.
CONCLUSION
This section will be divided into two parts. The first will sum-
marize and draw conclusions specifically relevant to the use of
comity in Abduction Convention cases. The second will consider
the wider implications of the theoretical framework developed in
this study on understanding the proper scope of the doctrine of
comity in the global era.
A. Comity in Abduction Convention Cases
This Article’s analysis of the use of comity in Abduction Con-
vention cases has shown that, while the doctrine of comity has
been “bandied about” by some courts to justify the return of the
child,395 this use is often based on misconceptions about the Con-
vention itself, and the real interests of the respective states.396
Indeed, this Article shows that, in many of the contexts in which
comity is invoked, the requesting state does not have a strong
interest in the return of the child,397 and that substantive poli-
cies, especially the need to protect the child, often prevail over
the comity interests of one or both states.
Moreover, the premise that the comity interests of both states
require compliance with the Convention, albeit justified, does
not mean that comity should inform the interpretation and ap-
plication of the Convention or the exercise of discretion thereun-
der. Indeed, such an approach involves circular reasoning be-
cause it is only possible to know whether the Convention is being
complied with once the proper interpretation and application
have been determined. The principle of purposive interpreta-
tion398 requires that this determination be made in the light of
the objectives underlying the Convention. Thus, comity should
395 See supra Part II.B.
396 See generally supra Part III.A.
397 E.g. in cases of consensual removal, see supra Part II.A.1.
398 As mandated by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May
23, 1969, 1115 U.N.T.S. 331. For a detailed discussion of implications of the
Vienna Convention on interpretation of the Abduction Convention, see SCHUZ,
supra note 111, at Chapter 5.
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not be cited to justify a narrow interpretation of the excep-
tions,399 apart from, perhaps, the human rights exception, the
invocation of which typically results in a direct infringement of
comity interests.
Similarly, comity should not be treated as a relevant factor in
exercising discretion to return a child, which arises where one of
the exceptions is established,400 since ex hypothesi, the very fact
that an exception has been established means that there is no
obligation to return the child. Rather, the focus should be on the
substantive policies behind the relevant exception and, most im-
portantly, the best interests of the child. Additionally, it is inap-
propriate to rely on the doctrine of comity as an excuse not to
investigate whether the requesting state can adequately protect
the returning child—or whether undertakings will be enforced
in the requesting state.401 Even though at first glance these
practices appear to infringe the comity interests of the request-
ing state, upon further inspection they may actually promote
that interest, where they enable the child to be returned.402 In
any event, the interest of both states in protecting the child must
always prevail over their respective comity interests.
In contrast, however, in the context of recognition of foreign
non-return orders, the comity interest of the judgment-render-
ing state in not having the merits of its decision reviewed is very
strong. Thus, it is paradoxical that in this context some North
American courts have given little weight to the doctrine of com-
ity, and have even declined to recognize non-return orders, on
the basis that the foreign court had not applied the Convention
properly.403 This Article argues that the respective comity and
substantive interests of both states require that deference be
given to the non-return order, unless there is truly a manifest
and fundamental misapplication of the Abduction Conven-
tion.404 Moreover, while the reciprocal obligations in the Con-
vention do not extend to recognition of non-return orders, the
spirit of mutual trust that underlies the Convention requires
399 The question of the extent to which the objectives of the Convention might
require narrow interpretation of the exceptions is outside the scope of this Ar-
ticle.
400 See supra Part II.B.2.
401 See supra at II.B.3.
402 See supra at III.C.3.
403 See supra at II.B.4.
404 See supra at III.C.4.
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such recognition—to avoid encouraging counter-abductions in-
ter alia.405
This Article urges that caution be exercised when using the
doctrine of comity in international cases concerning children. In
particular, unlike in civil and commercial disputes,406 what is at
stake is not simply which forum will adjudicate the case407 or
whether a foreign decision should be recognized,408 but where
the child will live in the meantime, a determination that may
have an irreversible impact on her welfare.409
Indeed, common law, in refusing to give effect to foreign cus-
tody judgments,410 recognized that the welfare of the child over-
rides the policies of reciprocity and deference to foreign judg-
ments.411While the Abduction Convention has replaced the com-
mon law, that Convention is based primarily on protecting the
interests of children—not on the doctrine of comity.412 Thus def-
erence is given to foreign law and foreign decisions, because do-
ing so promotes the interests of abducted children, not out of rec-
iprocity or judicial courtesy.413Moreover, while in financial mat-
405 See supra at III.C.4.
406 For evidence of increasing importance of the doctrine of comity in commer-
cial contexts, see for example, Paul, supra note 9, at 35–38 and Edward Janger,
Reciprocal Comity, 46 TEX. INT’L L. J. 441 (2011).
407 Although this issue may be determinative of the outcome of the case, in
addition to having a significant effect on the cost of the litigation. See generally
David Robertson, The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens: An Object
Lesson in Uncontrolled Discretion, 29 TEX. INT’L L. J. 353 (1994).
408 Although this may have enormous financial implications for the parties.
409 PEREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 32, ¶ 44; e.g., Van De Sande v. Van De
Sande, 431 F3d. 567, 570–71 (7th Cir. 2005) (warning against treating the
Hague Convention as a venue statute designed “to deter parents from engaging
in international forum shopping in custody cases.”).
410 McKee v. McKee, [1951] A.C. 352 (P.C.).
411 FAWCETT, supra note 33, at 731.
412 While Article 1 of the Abduction Convention states that one of its objects is
“to ensure that rights of custody and access under the law of one Contracting
State are effectively respected in other Contracting States,” the Perez-Vera Re-
port explains that this object is “teleologically connected” with the object of
ensuring prompt return, rather than being an object in its own right. PEREZ-
VERAREPORT, supra note 32, ¶ 17. It should also be noted that the word comity
does not appear at all in the Perez-Vera Report. Id.
413 The Perez-Vera Report points out that “with the exception of the indirect
means of protecting custody rights, which is implied by the obligation to return
the child to the holder of the right of custody, respect for custody rights falls
almost entirely out of the scope of the Convention.” Id.
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ters it may be appropriate for comity interests, such as main-
taining good international relationships and not deterring inter-
national commerce, to prevail over the interests of particular
creditors or others, in the child abduction context, it is morally
indefensible to sacrifice the interests of a particular child for the
sake of diplomatic relationships or even in the hope that this will
prevent other children from being abducted.
B. The Scope of Comity in the Global Era
This Article uses cases decided under the Abduction Conven-
tion and the UNCITRALModel Law on Cross-Border Insolvency
to test the scope of the doctrine of comity in the global era. While
the analysis relates specifically to the use of comity in interpret-
ing and applying international instruments, and exercising dis-
cretion under them, the framework developed for the purpose of
that analysis can also be employed in other contexts in which
the concept of comity is engaged.
This framework is founded on the original theoretical basis for
the doctrine, combined with interest analysis methodology. The
starting point is the recognition that the doctrine of comity was
intended to serve the interests of individual states, and that it is
based on the assumption that the benefits of giving effect to for-
eign laws and judgments serve the mutual interests of both
states. These interests—here called “comity interests”—include
the forum’s interest in maintaining good international relations,
participating in international commerce, and the foreign state’s
interest in having its law and judgments respected, without re-
view and without interference in its legal process. These comity
interests, however, are far from absolute, and they may be out-
weighed by the countervailing substantive interests or policies
of either state. In some cases, the prevalence of the latter inter-
ests will lead to a false conflict. In many cases, the countervail-
ing substantive interests will result in a real conflict. Where in-
terests are in real conflict, that conflict must be resolved by
weighing all of the competing interests—including the comity in-
terests.
Finally, the impact of globalization on comity is not limited to
the fact that greater interdependence of states strengthens the
comity interests of the forum because of the greater importance
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of international relations and international commerce.414 Glob-
alization has also brought with it the recognition of universal
norms, such as the rights of children—including their right to
protection415—the unacceptability of violence against women,416
and equality and fairness between creditors.417 This develop-
ment across borders may mean that these norms will be equally
applied in both states, which would facilitate comity. It may also
mean, however, that increased weight should be given to the
substantive interests of the forum, which are based on these
global norms, in situations where deference to the foreign law
would be inconsistent with them. This might be the case where,
for example, the foreign law enforces the custody rights of the
left-behind parent without ensuring proper protection for the
child418—likewise, where foreign law cannot provide protection
for the mother against domestic violence by the father, or where
it would lead to preference being given to local creditors. In such
cases, the very fact that the substantive interests of the forum
are based on global norms, rather than purely partisan nation-
alist policies, makes it more likely that they will prevail over the
comity interests of both states. Again, this insight shows that
the proper scope of comity in the global era can only be deter-
mined by analyzing carefully the respective comity interests and
the relevant substantive interests of both states.
414 Paul, supra note 9.
415 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 223.
416 Barbara Stark, Domestic Violence and International Law: Good-Bye Earl
(Hans, Pedro, Gen, Chou, etc.), 47 LOY. L. REV. 255 (2001) (citing inter alia the
1993 UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, the UN
Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women,
The UN Convention Against Torture and the Inter-American Convention on
Violence Against Women).
417 MODEL LAW, supra note 300, arts. 13, 22; GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note
311, ¶¶118–19, 198.
418 For example, in a case where custody is automatically transferred to the
left-behind parent, even where his fitness is clearly in doubt.
